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ABSTRACT
Three recovery system s for retrieving scientific payloads from
Aerobee 350 Sounding Rocket Vehicles were designed and fabricated,
development tested, qualification tested, and field tested in aircraft
drops. The units utilize a two-stage aerodynamic decelerator system
with associated timing, programing and control circuitry. The
equipment is described in detail, and the preliminary aerodynamic,
thermal and structural analyses are discussed. The development tests
are covered, including structural integrity tests, separation system
tests, first and second stage decelerator deployment tests and air drop
tests, pyrotechnic initiation tests, electrical system performance and
shock survival tests, and high temperature pulse test. The Qualifica-
tion and Acceptance Test Program and the field drop tests are also
discussed. For the latter, Field Checkout Units were designed and
built, and their operation is described.
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FINAL PROJECT REPORT
FOR
AEROBEE 350 RECOVERY SYSTEM
1. 0 RECOVERY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
1.1 System Description
The Aerobee 350 Sounding Rocket Payload Recovery System, see
figure 1 and 2, is a sophisticated, two stage deceleration device in-
corporating a redundant electrical control subsystem, a redundant
pyrotechnic subsystem, a pneumatic inflation subsystem, and a
passive thermal control subsystem. It is designed to recover a 300
to 700 pound net weight payload from a hostile re-entry environment
and with a terminal velocity of 30 feet per second. Physically, the
unit consists of a cylindrical package 22 inches in diameter, 13.75
inches in overall length, and approximately 110 pounds gross weight.
When mounted to the flight vehicle the recovery system has a skin
length of 12.62 inches, see drawing 206600 in Appendix A. The
center of gravity of the recovery system is located approximately
6.75 inches from the face of the forward mounting ring.
1. 2 Deceleration Devices
Two deceleration devices are utilized on the recovery system:
the first stage decelerator is a paraloon, and the second and final
stage is an extended skirt parachute.
1.2. 1 Paraloon
The paraloon is a uniquely designed decelerator which is part
parachute and part balloon, hence the name paraloon. The balloon
part of the paraloon is a bladder which when inflated takes on
roughly the shape of an ice cream cone. More specifically, it has
the shape of a frustum of an inverted cone having a hemispherical
top and a flat base. The overall height is 56 inches, with the maxi-
mum diameter of 21 inches and a base diameter of 15.12 inches.
The parachute part is a flat canopy in the shape of an annular
disk which is fastened to the paraloon at the maximum diameter of
the latter. The suspension lines are attached to the outer perimeter
of the 7.5 foot diameter skirt and to the circumferential bridle near
the base of the paraloon. This skirt is initially reefed to the side of
the balloon. A buffer is also attached near the base of the paraloon
in order to inhibit any abrasion of the bladder material.
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The bladder is constructed of nomex (high temperature nylon) cloth,
which is coated on both sides with polyurethane to form an air tight
fabric. The remainder of the paraloon is fabricated from basic nomex
material.
The paraloon is deployed with the firing of the explosive valve of
the reservoir system. The stored gas is directed into the packed
paraloon, forcing it to push against the domed paraloon cover. When
the pressure is sufficiently high, the screws fastening the cover
extension ring to the paraloon separation ring are sheared and the
paraloon is deployed.
Four seconds after deployment, two pyrotechnic reefing line
cutters function, disreefing the skirt so that it may inflate to its full
diameter. Operation of either reefing line cutter will deploy the drag
skirt. The paraloon has a calculated drag area of 4.25 sq ft in the
reefed state and 25.0 sq ft disreefed.
1.2.2 Parachute
The parachute utilized for the recovery system is a nominal 35 foot
diameter, 10 percent flat extended skirt parachute. The canopy of the
parachute consists of 1. 1 and 0.7 ounce per square yard material
fabricated into a total of 36 gores. A total of 18 continuous suspension
lines are used, each of which are secured to one leg of the bridle, pass
up over the vent of the parachute and terminate at a second leg of the
two legged bridle. The suspension lines are fabricated from nylon cord
with a rated tensile strength of 200 pounds.
The "X" shaped bridle is fabricated from 6000 pounds, 1 inch wide
webbing which is secured to the recovery system structure.
The parachute is packed in a toroidal shaped bag which is secured
to the parachute cover.
Deployment of the parachute is initiated by detonating the 7 gr/ ft
FLSC charge which severs the paraloon separation ring. The paraloon
then becomes a drogue which extracts the parachute. The parachute is
deployed reefed at the edge of the skirt. Four seconds after deployment,
the fourteen foot long reefing line is severed by either of the two pyro-
technic reefing line cutters, allowing the parachute to fill completely.
The parachute has a calculated drag area during filling in the
reefed state of 50 sq ft, increasing to a final drag area of 81 sq ft
before disreef. The fully disreefed parachute has a calculated drag
area of 775 sq ft under a steady state condition. This is designed to
provide a terminal velocity of approximately 30 feet per second.
4
1.3 Electrical Control Systems
Two identical electrical control systems are incorporated in the
recovery system. These are designated as Control System "A" and
Control System "B". Either of these systems can perform all the
required functions. In addition, the timers and relays in each system
provide a back up function in event of failure of the corresponding
component in the other system. The Schematic and Reference
Designation Diagram are presented in Appendix I as drawings 206590
and 206592, respectively.
Both control systems are capable of operating in either a pro-
grammed mode or a command mode or a combination of the two
modes. The programmed mode is a completely automatic sequencing
of the functions of the recovery system and will result in a normal
recovery with the recovery events occurring at a preset time or
altitude. The command mode allows for deviation from a normal
programmed recovery sequence to the extent that a particular event
may be commanded to take place from the ground, but only if the
necessary command is received prior to the time the programmed
mode automatically executes the particular event. The command
mode also allows for a mission abort. In this case the only
command necessary would be Separation, which would then allow
the payload to be recovered in a normal fashion.
1. 3. 1 Programm ed Mode, Normal Recovery
The following is a description of the control system operating
during a typical flight in the automatic or programmed mode. The
referenced designations given correspond to those presented on the
Schematic Drawing 206590 (see Appendix I).
Upon first movement of the Aerobee 350 vehicle after motor
ignition, the recovery system lanyard pins are pulled allowing the
switch plungers to retract into the recovery system. The eight
lanyard operated switches, 51 through 54 of lA2A2 and lA2A3 switch
assemblies, then change state, thus applying "A" system battery
power to the "A" system timer motor and "B" system battery power
to the "B" system timer motor. Both timers begin operation at this
time and continue to operate until power is removed from the motors
by cam activation of switches 54 in timer lA1Ml and 54 in timer
lAlM2. The timer "turn-off" position is chosen after the timers
have activated the separation detonators in the normal recovery mode.
After the timers have functioned for a preset time switch 52 of
each timer is actuated. These switch closures arm the normal'
recovery mode and the command mode of the "A" and "B" systems.
The preset time for the 52 switch may be as early as five seconds
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after launch (after separation from the vehicle) to as late as any time
prior to separation by either programmed or command mode. Arming
of the normal recovery mode consists of switch S2 of the "A" system
timer completing the "A" circuit to S5 of the "A" timer and S6 of the
"B" timer, and switch S2 of the "B" system timer completing the "B"
circuit to S5 of the "B" timer and S6 of the "A" timer.
Switches S5 and S6 on each timer are activated at the preselected
time for separation. Control system "A" power passes through S5 of
IA 1M I, the lanyard operated switches, the closed contacts between
pins 3 and 9 of relays K6 and K8, through the Flight/Arm connector
plug. to the separation "A" detonator. In a similar fashion control
system "B" power passes through S5 of lAIM2, the lanyard switches,
the closed contacts between pins 3 and 9 of K5 and K7 relays, through
the Flight/Arm connector plug, to the separation "B" detonator.
Switch S6 of both timers forms a segment of the cross redundancy of
the recovery system and will be discussed later in this report.
At the same time that the "A" and "B" system detonators are
initiated, "A" system power is applied to the "A" circuit portion of
the aneroid switch assembly and the time delay circuit S I and "B"
system power is applied to the "B" circuit portion of the aneroid
switch assembly and the time delay circuit S2. After a 10 second
interval S 1 actuates applying "A" system power to the coil of relay K3
closing the contact 1 and 10 in the "A" circuit and 4 and 9 in the "B"
circuit. Similarly S2 applies "B" system power to the coil of relay
K4 closing contact 1 and 10 in the "A" circuit and 4 and 9 in the "B"
circuit. Functioning of either of these time delay circuits arms the
aneroid circuit in both the "A" and "B" system. In a normal flight
the altitude switches are open at this time.
When the preset altitude is reached (descending), the altitude
switches in both circuits close. Power from the "A" system battery
is applied to the coils of the KID and Kl2 relays. These relays
change state. Relay Kl2 completes the "A" circuit to the "A"
paraloon squib and its protective delay pyrotechnic switch. Relay KID
completes the "B" circuit to the "B" paraloon squib and its protective
pyrotechnic delay switch. Power from the "B" system battery is
applied to the coils of the K9 and Kll relays. These relays change
state. Relay Kll completes the "B" circuit to the "B" paraloon
squib and its protective pyrotechnic delay switch. Relay K9 completes
the "A" circuit to the "A" paraloon squib and its protective pyrotechnic
delay switch. The function of the pyrotechnic delay switches is to
remove power from the paraloon squibs four seconds after they have
been fired.
In addition to initiating paraloon deployment relays K9 and/or Kl2
apply "A" system battery power to time delay switch S3 and relays KID
and/or Kll apply "B" system power to time delay switch S4. After
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15 seconds tIme delay S3 closes and applies "A" system battery power
to relay K14. This relay changes state initiating the "A" system
parachute deployment squib. Similarly S4 closes and applies "B"
system battery power to relay K13. This relay changes state initiating
the "B" sys tem parachu te deployment squib. This com plete s the
normal sequence of events of the programmed mode of flight.
1.3.2 Command Mode, Normal Recovery
The operation of the normal recovery system command mode is
identical with the operation of the programmed mode up through the
operation of the S2 switches of the timers. Arming of the command
mode by the closure of S2 of the "A" system timer consists of applying
"A" system power to the open contacts between pins 1 and 10 of relays
K6 and K8 and to pin G of the interface connector lPL Similarly, S2
of the "B" system timer applies "B" system power to the open contacts
between pins 1 and 10 of relays K5 and K7 and pin F of the interface
connector lPl.
The command link to operate the command mode must be provided
as part of the payload and range support. Pins F and G in the interface
connector apply "A" and "B" system power to the proper sets of open
contacts on the command receiver located in the payload. At the
desired time in the Aerobee 350 flight profile for command operation
a command receiver contact closure must be initiated by the range
command transmitter. Transmission of the command signal may be
based on time after launch or real time range tracking information.
Initiation of the "A" system separation command provides a path for
"A" system power from pin G to pin E on lPl, actuating relays K6
and K5. These relays change state removing the programmed timer
from the circuit and completmg the path for "A" system power through
contacts 1 and 10 of K6 to the separatlOn "A" squib and for "B" system
power through contacts 1 and 10 of K5 to the separation "B" squib.
Similarly, initiation of the "B" system separation command provides
a path for "B" system power from pin F to pin D on 1 PI actuating
relays K7 and K8. These relays perform the same function as
relays K6 and K5.
The redundancy and cross connection feature of the separation
relays will be discussed in another section of this report. Following
separation command it is possible to allow the programmed mode to
complete the sequence of operations of the recovery system in the
same manner as it would have been accomplished if the program
timers had initiated separation. The system, however, does provide
the capability of commanding paraloon deployment. Paraloon com-
mand may be employed where good real time range tracking data is
available. Initiation of the "A" system paraloon command provides
a path for "A" system power from pin G to pin Bon lPl, actuating
relay KL This relay changes state providing a path for "A" system
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power through contacts 1 and 10 of Kl and for "B" system power
through 4 and 9 of Kl. The effect of this is to apply power to the KIa,
K12, K9 and Kll relays through a path which bypasses the Sl and S2
time delay circuits, the aneroid switches and the contacts of relays
K3 and K4. When power is applied to the KIa, K12, K9 and Kll relays
the paraloon squib pyrotechnic switch grounds are removed and power
is applied to the squibs in the same manner as in the programmed
mode.
Parachute deployment will occur 15 seconds later in the same
manner as in the programmed mode of operation. The capability for
command parachute deployment has been provided in the recovery
system by providing a path for "A" and "B" system power to reach
the coils of K14 and K13 relays from the IPI interface connector.
It is thus possible with the command system to bypass the programmed
mode of operation through the S3 and S4 time delays and fire the
parachute deployment squibs.
It should be emphasized that the programmed mode is always
present and functioning and that the command mode is merely a
means of overriding or backing up the former by commanding an
event (Separation, Paraloon Deployment, Parachute Deployment) to
take place at a time different than programmed. If such an event
command is not received by the time the event takes place via the
programmed mode, then the later mode prevails and executes the
event. Thus a cotnmand system failure, human error, or any other
operational anomaly resulting in failure of the recovery system to
receive most commands will not result in failure of the recovery
mis sian.
1.3.3 Command Abort Mode
It has been previously stated that the command mode can be
armed by the S2 switches of the'timer at a preset time which can
be as early as 5 seconds. This feature allows the user to exercise
the option of having a command abort mode for the recovery system.
If the S2 switch is set for 5 seconds, which is after burnout of the
first stage Nike booster, it is possible to command separation at a
very early time in the flight. This capability may be a desirable
feature if it is desired to maximize the probability of a successful
recovery in the event of an early cut down of the vehicle by range
safety. It should be noted that a separation command below 20, 000
feet altitude will not result in a paraloon deployment if the payload
coasts to a higher altitude in less than 10 seconds. In the event
that it does, paraloon deployment would take place when the vehicle
reaches 20, 000 feet on the way down. Of course, it is always
possible to command paraloon immediately following separation in
the event trajectory information indicates the payload is falling
rather than rising and is at an altitude of 5, 000 feet above the terrain.
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1.3.4 Failure Modes and Effects
A discussion of individual major component failure and also of
several simultaneous major component failures and the resulting
effect upon the recovery system will be discussed in this section.
Due to the symmetry of the "A" and "B" electrical circuits, a
failure of a component or components in one circuit only will in-
troduce effects into the system which are identical to the effects
introduced by the same component or components failing in the other
circuit only. Sample failure modes will be assumed in this discussion
in the "A" circuit only, and due to the above symmetry considerations
the reader may see that failures of like components in the "B" circuit
would introduce like effects.
Since full redundancy is provided in the system, a loss of all of
circuit "A", by whatever means, will not deter the recovery system
from properly fulfilling its recovery task, as circuit "B" will con-
tinue to perform all necessary functions.
The loss of the "A" battery will result in the loss of all "A"
circuit functions, since the "A" circuit relays will not receive
power.
The failure of the "A" timer to start will result in the loss of all
"A" circuit functions. The failure of the "A" timer (lA1Ml) by a
stoppage after actuation of the 52 switch will not result in the loss of
all "A" circuit functions. It may be seen that power will be routed
to meet the "A" power requirements by the "B" timer (IA1M2).
At the activation of 56 on lA1M2, "A" power will be fed to 55 on
lAlM 1. Since that pole has not been activated, "A" power will be
fed through it and the lanyard switches and relays K6-K8 to the "A"
power buss. All remaining "A" circuit functions may then be fulfilled
using "A II power.
The failure of either complete lanyard switch assembly, or the
failure of anyone lanyard switch without the failure of the corre-
sponding switch in the other lanyard switch assembly will not inhibit
complete system function. This may be seen by examination of the
schematic.
Should time delay 51 fail in the open mode, its associated relay
K3 will not actuate. Assuming such a failure, 52 will still cause K4
actuation after 10 seconds and the contacts of relay K4 which are
redundant to K3 will insure circuit "A" path integrity and thus both
circuits will function normally. The failure of the delay circuit by
shorting will cause activation of the associated relay at the instant
of separation. The function affected by this action is that the
required compulsory 10 second delay between separation and
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paraloon deployment in the command mode only is negated. However,
to fail by shorting would be extremely unlikely, because the switch is
normally open and its single closing during a particular mission com-
pletes its function. The failure of K3 to function will result in identical
consequences to that caused by time delay failure in the open mode.
The failure of a single aneroid switch to open during vehicle ascent
or close during vehicle descent will not result in a failure of either the
"A" or the "B" system to function properly. The four aneroid switch
assemblies are wired into the "All and HB II circuits respectively in a
series/parallel arrangement. It may be seen from an examination of
the schematic how this switch arrangement provides the necessary
protection.
The relay configuration of KIO-KI2-K9-KII assures a high degree
of reliability in the paraloon deployment function of the recovery system.
The redundant-cros s -redundant contact configuration of the relays has
been designed such that anyone of the four relays can fail to operate
with no loss of complete system function by both "A" and "B" circuits.
Further, any three of the four relays may fail to operate and one com-
plete circuit will still function. These combinations may be verified by
examination of the schematic.
A failure of time delay 53 to close will result in failure to energize
K14. The "B" circuit, however, will initiate deployment. A failure of
Kl4 itself will similarly have no effect.
The failure of either delay circuit (53 or 54) by shorting will result
in the activation of the parachute deployment relay and result in parachute
deployment at the time of paraloon deployment. This would cause failure
to recover the payload, but as was discussed earlier for 51 and 52, this
mode of failure of the time delays, as employed in this system, is
extremely unlikely.
The combination of failures of squibs and/or detonators 1S obvious
and will not be discussed further in this report.
A failure within the system of either circuit battery or a failure of
either timer to start inhibits the application of the circuit power to the
interface connector IPI and the programmed mode timer switch. Thus
all functions controlled by that circuit's power will be lost. The other
system function would be unimpaired. However, as previously noted
a timer stoppage after arming of the programmed and command modes
by the timer will not result in the loss of that system.
The contact configuration of the command separation relays K5,
K6, K7 and K8 is arranged such that a failure of any single relay to
operate on command will not deter the proper function of both circuits.
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A simultaneous failure of both K6 and K8 or K5 and K7 will result in
only one circuit being able to ignite its separation detonator. However,
any other combination of two simultaneous relay failures will not deter
the capability of both circuits to function normally. Further, any three
of the four relays may fail to actuate and one of the two circuits will
remain capable of firing its associated detonators.
A failure of either command paraloon relay Kl or K2 to actuate
will not reduce complete system function due to the cross connection
of their contacts.
It should be noted that throughout this discussion of failure mode
and effect investigation the primary failure mode assumed for the
latching relays used in the recovery system has been failure to
actuate. Although Minuteman Electronic Parts Failure Percentages,
No. D2-l6358-1, lists failure to transfer as 43 percent of failure
modes, it is believed that the failure to transfer percentage is very
much higher in this system. The rationale for this assumption
follows. Open or shorted relay coils exhibit themselves in this
system in an identical way to relay failure to transfer. Also, no
relay contact in the system is required to open under electrical load
and therefore the probability of contact degradation leading to contact
welding is reduced. Further, the preflight checkout of the electrical
system will verify contact integrity.
In the previous discussions, it was assumed for purpose of
presentation that the timers operating normally would provide con-
tact closure at the saIne time, or if one failed, then its contacts
would not subsequently actuate during the cour se of the flight. A
more realistic operating condition for a flight where no timer
failures are evidenced is one where one of the timer's contacts
are activated just before the other timer's contacts. This is brought
about, of course, by a lack of completely perfect synchronization of
the two tim er s.
It may be seen by examination of the schematic that for this
brief period of time, the timer that is running the slowest will
appear to the circuitry in an identical way as if it had failed. That
is to say that if circuit "A" timer reaches its separation time prior
to the circuit rlB l1 timer, circuit "All power will be delivered to the
"A" separation detonator through switch S5 of timer lAlMl and
separation will occur. The timers are configured in such a manner
that the first of the four switches, S5 and S6 of both timers, to
change state will result in separation. In reality, simultaneous
detonation of both detonators will be purely coincidental and would
require exact synchronization of the switches.
However, in the event that timer "A" failed with the "A" circuit
battery functioning at some point after arming of the programmed
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and command modes, either switch S5 or S6 of IAIM2, whichever
reaches switch closure first, will apply power to the "B" or "A"
separation detonator, respectively, but not to both. If switch S5
closes first, "B" power is transferred directly to the "B" separation
detonator. If switch S6 closes first, "A" power is transferred
through S6 of timer IAIM2 and S5 of timer IAIMI and then on to the
"A" separation detonator through the normal circuitry. Again, only
one detonator would be ignited. The remaining detonator would be
destroyed by the violence of the pyrotechnic event. When power
would be applied to that detonator, an open circuit would exist.
A similar situation is evident if the circuit terminology is re-
versed due to the symmetry of the control system. The timers are
redundant in the sense that if one timer would fail after system arming,
the other timer still has the capability of initiating either detonator.
The above is true for all three pairs of squibs incorporated in
the system in that a truly simultaneous initiation for the 8ame event
i8 purely coincidental.
1. 3. 5 Circuit Features
1.3.5.1 Event Marker
Provision is made within the recovery system to provide as a telem-
etry input an indication of squib ignition. This is accomplished by an
event marker circuit. The circuit consists of a torroidal transformer
whose primary is in series with the power buss. Current surges on the
buss are transformer coupled to a pulse shaper circuit from the second-
ary of the transformer. The pulse shaper limits and stretches the
transformer pulse to one suitable for telemetry use. Separation event
marker circuits are used for channel "A lr and channel liB" monitoring.
1. 3. 5.2 Relay Reset
All relays used in this system are magnetic latching, double coil,
with four form "C" contacts, not necessarily all used. Complete
operation in either preflight checkout or in actual flight requires no
more than one actuation per relay. To enable expedient resetting of
relays to proper preflight position, a relay reset provision is made
at the checkout connector IAIJ1. All relay reset coils are connected
in parallel and brought to this connector through leads electrically
isolated from the balance of the recovery system circuitry.
1. 3.5.3 Relay and Timer Status
Each relay used in the system has one set of contacts used only
to indicate status. These contacts are wired such that if all of them
are in a proper preflight condition, a circuit path i8 maintained to the
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umbilical and checkout connector s which may be used as an indication
of a "safe" status. If anyone relay is not returned to its preflight
condition, this path is broken, resulting in an indication of an unsafe
condition. The relays are grouped such that those used for command
recovery may be monitored separately from those for programmed
recovery. Switch 53 on both timers are similarly interconnected such
that if either is not in its preflight condition an "unsafe" indication
will be given. These status condition leads are brought to both
umbilical and checkout connector s.
1.3.5.4 Timer Reset
After each flight and after each preflight operation of the timer s,
it is necessary to reset them to their preflight condition by external
application of power through the checkout connector lAlJl. Both 51
switches are connected such that this applied power will be fed to the
timer motors until they reach the proper preflight position, at which
tim e the 51 switch position will change, disconnec ting external power
and reconnecting the motor to the internal power buss.
1.3.5.5 Function Status
Provision is made within the recovery system to monitor and
provide to the teleme try interfac e connector, 1P 1, the paraloon
deployment gas bottle pressure analog and to provide an indication
of separation of the vehicle motor section from the recovery section.
Internal resistor bias networks provide appropriate output signals for
monitoring. Power for status monitoring must be provided from a
regulated 5 volt supply through the IPI interface connector.
1. 3.6 Components and Subas semblies
The following sections will discuss the components and sub-
assemblies of the control systems. It must be noted that the recovery
system is designated as Unit 1 electrically, and therefore all com-
ponent identifications have the prefix 1.
1. 3. 6.1 Batteries
Power is supplied independently to each control system from a
pair of Culton Nickel Cadmium 10VO. 500 SSCP batteries, providing
both 12 and 24 volt source s. The 12 volt power is for the tim er only,
while the 24 volt source is for the remainder of the control system.
The removable battery assemblies are designated at lA1A2 and lA1A3
for the "A" and "B" control systems, respectively.
The battery assemblies are delivered uncharged. The correct
charging rate for the batteries is 25 to 40 mao A full charge requires
20 hours at a 40 ma rate. The batteries may be trickle charged
indefinitely at a 7 to 12 ma rate.
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1.3.6.2 LanyardAssemblies
None of the events of the recovery system, either in the programmed
or command modes, can take place if the lanyard pins have not been
pulled.
The lanyard assemblies are cross coupled so that in the event one
lanyard is not pulled, both "A" and "B" control systems will still
function properly.
Each of the lanyard assemblies, designated lA2A2 and lA2A3, is
composed of four switches designated Sl through S4. Each of the
switches is essentially a double pole double throw configuration. S I is
a part of the IrA Il circuit and is in series with timer "A tl for the functions
of Command Arming and "A" Sepation. S2 provides the same functions
for the "BII circuit. Switch 53 starts both of the rlA" and "B t ' timers,
while S4 is for lanyard status only, to indicate a Safe or Unsafe condition
on the Checkout Unit.
I. 3.6.3 Program Timer s
Two removable program timers are incorporated in the control
system, and are designated lAlMl and IAIM2 for the "A" and "B"
control systems, respectively. The timers, manufactured by
Datametrics, Inc. are of a 720 second maximum duration. The
timers will draw 325 rna a piece at 12 ± 2 volts dc. Six individually
adjustable cams are pro~ided, with each cam operating a SPDT micro-
switch. Cams 1, 3, and 4 are of the single detent design while cams 2,
5, and 6 are of the split type with adjustable dwell. The timers are
normally delivered with the cams set at nominal values and should be
properly set prior to a flight.
Number I cam is for timer control, i. e. starting the timer and
providing for timer reset and runout functions. Cam No. 2 is for
command and programmed mode arming. The third cam is for Timer
Status, either Safe or Unsafe as indicated on the Checkout Unit.
Number 4 cam is for timer control and turns off the timer. The
number 5 cam establishes "A" separation for the !'A II timer and "B"
separation for the "B" timer, while the number 6 cam controls the
IIB ll separation for the ItA" timer and "A" separation for the liB"
timer.
For cams 5 and 6, if one timer should fail, after performing its
arming function, the other timer will apply power to the lIAI' and liB II
separation circuits. However, due to the nature of the event of
separation, either cam of either timer, whichever reaches switch
closure first will detonate only one detonator, the other being
destroyed by the violence of the explosion.
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1. 3. 6. 4 Aneroid System
The aneroid system consists of a sealed chamber housing four
aneroid switch assemblies, three pressure sensing ports mounted on
120 degree centers on the skin of the recovery system, and equal
lengths of tubing leading from the ports to the aneroid chamber. The
aneroid system is a segment of the programmed mode control system
providing for paraloon deploy.
The heart of the aneroid system IS the four pressure sensmg
aneroid switches contained in the aneroid chamber. Each aneroid
switch consists of a bellows, two microswitches and a cantilever arm
which actuates the microswitches. These switches are set to close
at a pressure altitude of 22,500 feet when descending. During ascent,
the switches open at approximately 23,000 feet pressure altitude. The
four switches are wired into the flAIl and "B" systems in a series/
parallel arrangement.
A removable plug IS provided in the aneroid chamber at the Fin III
position to allow flight simulation of the aneroid system operations with
the use of a calibrated vacuum pump in system. Of course, the three
pressure ports must be sealed with tape for this simulation.
A pressure transducer is mounted on the aneroid chamber and is
wired to the interface connector, IP1. The manifold pressure may be
monitored by telemetry with this transducer.
1. 3.6.5 Ground Safe and Flight Arm Connector
Two independent connect plugs are provided for connector lAlJ7,
the Ground Safe/Flight Arm connector. The Ground Safe (green.)
connector plug is normally installed for safety purposes for shipping
and handling. It provides a shorted condition across all of the pyro-
technic circuits.
The Flight Arm (red connector) plug is used for flight only and,
as the name implies, arms the pyrotechnic circuits so the detonators
may be ignited at the proper timer by the control systems. The Flight
Arm connector plug is normally installed during the Final Arming
Procedure.
It should be noted that the extracted lanyard system provides an
additional safety device prior to launch.
1. 3. 6.6 Protective Fuses
A protective series fuse is provided in each of the pyrotechnic
circuits. The function of these fuses is to protect the power supply if
an extended short should appear after a pyrotechnic device has functioned.
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In addition a pyrotechnic switch has been incorporated in the paraloon
squib circuits to remove these squibs from the line four seconds after
firing of the paraloon squibs.
1.3.6.7 Checkout and Status Monitoring
The recovery system control systems are designed with the capability
of being monitored through three connectors.
Connector lA1Jl, designated the checkout connector, is provided for
use with the Checkout Unit. This feature allows the control systems to
be exercised and monitored for proper operation.
Section 5.1 Recovery System Checkout Unit, discusses the various
capabilities provided.
Connector lJ9, which mounts to the aft face of the recovery system,
is provided for blockhouse monitoring of the recovery system. The
status of the lanyards, timers and relays can be monitored.
The final connector is connector lJl, which is the interface between
the recovery system and the telemetry system of the payload. This
connector is utilized for commanding the recovery system control cir-
cuits and monitoring the pressure reservoir, event marker circuits,
and the aneroid chamber pressure.
1. 3.6.8 Through Circuitry
Three separate cables are provided which pass through the recovery
system proper and are independent of the control system itself. They
appear on the Reference Designation Diagram, Drawing No. 206592 as
PIN's 206608, 206609, and 206610. The first two have 20 and 23 con-
ductors respectively, while the third consists of two coax cables.
1.4 Pyrotechnic Sys tern s
There are four pyrotechnic systems utilized in the operation of
the recovery system which provide the following functions.
A. Separation
B. Paraloon Deploym ent
C. Parachute Deployment
D. Paraloon and Parachute Disreef
1.4. 1 Separation
Separation of the recoverable payload is provided by a flexible linear
shaped charge (FLSC). It is a 15 grift RDX explosive with a Configura-
tion IV Lead Sheath, manufactured by the Ensign Bickford Company of
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Simsbury, Connecticut. The FISC is installed in the recovery system
structure and will sever the skin circumferentially at a point just aft
of the circular steel band.
In order to initiate the FLSC, a pair of detonators is utilized, one
for each control system. These are manufactured by Holex, Inc. of
Hollister, California, and are designated as Cook PIN 600190-001.
The explosive charge contained within each detonator consists of
100 mg of Lead Azide and 200 mg of RDX. It requires an electrical
impulse for detonation and has the approved 1 amp or 1 watt for five
minutes no-fire capability.
1.4.2 ParaloonDeployment
The paraloon is deployed by initiating one of the squibs within the
explosive valve. The squib generates a high pressure within the valve,
forcing a piston to shear a diaphragm thus releasing the high pressure
gas stored in the reservoir. A slip joint connection directs the gas
into the packed paraloon. When the proper amount of pressure has
been generated within the paraloon, the screws fastening the extension
ring to the paraloon separation ring shear. The paraloon cover is
then ejected and the paraloon deployed. The explosive valve mounts
to the air reservoir, and contains two independent and redundant
squibs, one for each of the control circuits. Each of these have the
approved 1 amp or I watt for five minutes no-fire rating. The valve
is manufactured by Cartridge Activated Devices, Inc., of Fairfield,
New Jersey.
The recovery system is delivered with the explosive valve in-
stalled, and with a shorting connector mated to connector IAIA4PI
for safety purposes.
1. 4. 3 Parachute Deployment
The parachute is deployed with the assistance of a 7 grift RDX
Configuration IV FLSC explosive char ge which severs the structural
ring restraining the paraloon. When the charge is initiated, the ring
is severed which releases the paraloon, and this in turn extracts the
parachute. The 7 grift FLSC is similar in design and function to the
15 grift FLSC used for separation. Again, two redundant detonator s
are provided, each a component of one of the control circuits.
These detonators are also manufactured by Holex, Inc., and have
similar electrical and pyrotechnic characteristics to the separation
detonators previously described, with the exception of having only
150 mg of RDX as the main charge. The connector and mounting
threads are different, however, to preclude the possibility of trans-
po sition between the two in installation and connection. The Cook
PIN is 600190-003.
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1. 4. 4 Paraloon and Parachute Disreef
Both the paraloon and the parachute are provided with a reefing line
in order to reduce the opening shock loads. At a nominal four seconds
from their respective deployments, the reefing lines are severed by the
reefing line cutter s. Two cutter s are installed on both the paraloon
and parachute.
The reefing line cutter is a lanyard operated pyrotechnic device
manufactured by Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., of Valley Forge,
Pennsylvania. Although the cutters are pyrotechnic in nature, they
do not pose a safety hazard such as do the FLSC and detonators.
1. 5 Reservoir System
The reservoir system is a basic high pressure gas storage
system incorporating a spherical steel reservoir, a remote fiIi/vent
pressurization coupling, a pressure transducer to monitor the
pressure, an explosive valve to release the gas when required and
the necessary interconnecting tubing.
The reservoir, fabricated from 4130 alloy steel, is centrally
located within the recovery system. Either high pressure dry air
or nitrogen may be used as the gaseous medium.
A remote fill breakaway-type male coupling is provided on the
exterior near Fin 1 of the recovery system pointing aft at an angle
of 45 degrees. Its purpose is to allow remote pressurization of the
reservoir prior to flight or to vent the pressurized reservoir in the
event of an extended hold.
In a normal launch, the pressurization hose with a mating female
coupling is automatically released by a special device which is a part
of the launch tower. Both segments of the coupling seal automatically
when disconnected.
The reservoir is normally pressurized some time in advance of
a flight to allow for temperature stabilization. A period of 24 hours
is recommended, to allow the re servoir to cool to room temperature.
An acceptable pressure for flight is between 3050 and 3500 psig.
The pressure transducer is utilized to monitor the reservoir
system pressure. The explosive valve, previously discussed, is
also a part of the system. When desired, the explosive valve
releases the gas which is turn deploys the paraloon.
1.6 Thermal Protection System
In the early part of the preliminary design phase of the program,
several trajectory analyse s were conducted varying the configuration,
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weight, center of gravity, spin rate and orientation of the payload prior
to re-entry. Due to the high re-entry velocities, several thermal
analyses were conducted in order to specify the necessary thickness of
ablation material required in order to limit the maximum temperature
of the recovery system to 400 degrees Fahrenheit. Appreciably higher
temperatures could have, for instance, damaged the paraloon fabric.
The ablation material selected is Thermolag T-395 manufactured
by Thermal Systems, Inc. of St. Louis, Missouri. This material be-
gins ablating at about 3950 F. The thicknesses established are sufficient
to maintain the temperature of the recovery system structure at a
maximum of 4000 F.
It must be noted that the Thermolag T-395 material is somewhat
fragile and should not be subjected to rough handling.
1.7 System Reliability
A reliability analysis of the Aerobee 350 Recovery System has
been performed and previously submitted as a separate report entitled
"Reliability Prediction, Aerobee 350 Recovery System." Due in part
to the relatively short flight time (approximately 700 seconds) the
probability of a successful mission is computed as 99.989 percent.
This is predicated on constant chance failure rates of all components
which in turn connote s a lack of any part wear out phenomenon during
the course of a flight.
Failure rates for the system components were taken from
MIL-HANDBOOK-217A where possible, and others were taken from
"Reliability Growth Prediction During the Initial Design Analysis, " a
paper by D. R. Earles which was published in the Proceedings of the
Seventh National Symposium on Reliability and Quality Control.
Application k-factors were applied on the rates obtained in each
Source. As an example, a basic failure rate fo!" batteries was taken
from the latter source and this number is 1.4 failures/10 6 hours.
This number was then multiplied by the missile application k-factor
of 400 (from the same source) for an adjusted battery failure rate,
in a missile, of 560 failures/ 106 hours.
A system mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) was calculated
f!"om a summation of the basic failure rates, taken parallel redun-
dancies into account in accordance with the formula:
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where
>. 1 = failure rate of one of the parallel branches in failures/l0 6
hours
>'2 = failure rate of the other parallel branch, also in
failur e s /l 0 6 hour s,
and
>.p = failure rate of the parallel combination, in failures/l0 6
hour s.
The recovery system MTBF was computed to be 169.9 hours, with
a total adjusted failure rate of 5884.89 failures per 106 hours of operation.
2.0 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
2.1 General
An extensive design and development program was undertaken and
accomplished during the course of this project. Studies were conducted
concerning vehicle aerodynamics, dispersion and thermal protection
during re -entry. The mechanical structure was designed, analyzed and
tested to withstand the various loads encountered. The various pyro-
technic and electromechanical components were selected and tested,
based on the environmental conditions prevailing. The electrical con-
trol systems were designed, developed and tested in order to establish
the maximum reliability of vehicle recovery attainable.
A previously submitted document entitled "Preliminary Design
and Analysis Report, Aerobee 350 Recovery System," dated September
1967, contains a thorough discussion of aerodynamic analysis, dis-
persion analysis, weight analysis and loads analysis; the reader is
referred to that document for consideration of these areas.
2.2 Thermal Analysis
Due to the high re-entry velocities which were disclosed during
the aerodynamic analysis, it became evident that thermal protection
of the recovery system will be necessary. To further define the
requirements, a computer study was performed by the Emerson
Electric Company of St. Louis, Missouri, utilizing the maximum
heating trajectories for the points under consideration.
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2.2. I Heating Considerations
The study was performed based on the following criteria:
a. A maximum allowable structure temperature of 400 0 F.
b. An initial structure temperature of 200 0 F.
A total of four positions on the recovery system structure were
selected as follows:
Position 1 - The center of the paraloon cover
Position 2 - The edge of the paraloon cover
Position 3 The edge or shoulder of the interface ring
Position 4 - The cylindrical side wall of the recovery system.
The initial study was performed utilizing Thermo-Lag, T-500
ablating material. However, during the course of this program, it
was discovered that the T-500 material requires a relatively high
curing temperature. Since the recovery system explosive components
are installed at the time of application, this presented a safety hazard
and was unacceptable. Thermo-Lag, T-395 was then selected since
it may be applied and cured at room temperature.
Trajectory Case 32, a 736 pound OGI-3, aft center of gravity,
six caliber configuration was selected for computing the required
Thermo-Lag thicknesses at positions I, 2, and 3. The angle of
attack at peak heating during re-entry is approximately 1700 F with
this trajectory, presenting the maximum total heat pulse due to the
essentially tail first condition.
Trajectory Case 21 was used to establish the ablative material
thickness required at position 4. This also represents a 736 pound
vehicle. However, the configuration is designated as C03-2 having
a forward center of gravity, six caliber vehicle length. The angle
of attack at peak heating is 70 0 presenting a slightly nose first
side re-entry.
2.3.2 Ablation Requirements
Since the initial study was performed based on utilizing the
Thermo-Lag, T-500 ablative material, the thicknesses computed
were revised and updated to that for the Thermo-Lag, T-395
material. The required thicknesses of the T-395 ablation material
are presented below.
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Position
I
2
3
4
T-395 Thickness
0.085 inch
0.085 inch
0.065 inch
0.058 inch
Using the above values, and a T-395 density of 88 lb/cu ft, the
total weight of ablation material required is computed to be 4.0
pounds. See drawing 206600 in the Appendix for further details of
the coating and masking. For the complete thermal analysis report,
see Section 6.0 of "Preliminary Design and Analysis Report."
It should be noted that thebe thicknesses were based on the most
severe re-entry trajectories and could probably be reduced for less
severe flights.
2.3 Decelerator System Analysis
2.3.1 Design Deployment CondItions
Although paraloons have been successfully deployed and have
functioned supersonically. they are es,;entially subsonic devIces.
The paraloon designed for use as a first stage decelerator is a
refinement of a successful design incorporated in another recovery
system. That system was successfully tested at dynamic pressures
of 500 psf at Mach 1. O. The design q for the Aerobee 350 Parloon
is 440 psf, allowing sufficient latitude for error in sensing of deploy-
ment conditions without exceeding 500 psf.
The most severe recovery condition re~ult::> from use of the short
(six caliber), heavy (736 pound) cone-cylinuer or ogive-cylinder re-
entry body trimmed for an angle of attack 01 180 degrees (most aft
CG location). While these configurations were investigated in the
Six Degree of Freedom (SDF) program as cases 24 and 32, respectively
(see "Preliminary Design and Analysis Report"), these cases assumed
a nose first re-entry attitude, requiring vehicle turn-around to the
trimmed condition. As indicated, the vehicle turn-around and oscilla-
tion about the trim POInt yields a higher average re-entry drag than
the same body re-entering tail first, which should be essentially the
same as the point maSb case with identical 180 degree drag. A com-
parison of data shows that case 24, the most severe SDF trajectory,
decelerates to· q = 440 psf, t = 59.62 sec, Mach 0.80, at 19.857 ft
altitude. The point ma,;s trajectory for the short, 736 pound re-entry
body, trimmed at 180 degrees, launched at 90 degrees decelerates to;
q = 442 psf, t = 58.3 sec, Mach 0.78, h = 18,400 ft, V = 814 fps.
These point mass data were therefore taken as the nominal deployment
design conditions for the paraloon.
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2.3.1.1 Altitude Sensing
Preliminary results of the wind tunnel testing to determine the
pressure coefficients on the aneroid port indicate that C p values of
-0.4 to -0.5 can occur which will result in a total pressure reading
of:
= 1035 + (-0.5) 440
= 815 psf
This corresponds to a standard pressure altitude of about 24,000 feet,
for an error of 5,600 feet for the design condition. This spread in
altitude error narrows as the vehicle decelerates. Trajectory
analysis indicates that for such a condition, the vehicle will descend
to 14,000 feet before the aneroids "see" a total pressure equal to
Pamb at 18,400 feet (1035 psf). The vehicle decelerates little, so
a C p = -0.5 still applies. Therefore, at 14,000 feet:
P T = 1242 -0.5(417)
= 1035 psf
As later calculations will show, for the stated design conditions, the
paraloon/parachute system reqilires about 6,700 feet to decelerate to
the nominal terminal velocity of 33.8 fps at 11,700 feet altitude.
Initiating deployment at 14,000 feet would delay this recovery
terminal velocity condition until the vehicle reached about 7,500 feet,
which is about 1,500 feet lower than the tallest peak in the area.
This, then, is a marginal condition which can be prevented by:
1. Adjusting the aneroids to trip at a higher altitude pressure;
say equivalent to 22,00 feet.
2. Command deployment.
2.3.2 DeploymentDynamics
2.3.2.1 Paraloon Deployment
The following design values are based upon the nominal deploy-
ment conditions of q = 440 psf at 18,400 feet, for 736 pound, six
caliber body trimmed at 180 degrees.
In order to reduce the opening shock, a 4 second reefing of the
paraloon skirt was incorporated. This is a unique, mid-skirt reefing
which reduces the full drag area of 25.0 ft2 to a value of 4.25 ft2,
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These values have been verified by drop test on previous programs. Initi-
ation of paraloon inflation is caused by firing the explosive value on
the air bottle. Within one second, the cover is ejected and the balloon
extends to full length. Firm inflation results at 2.0 - 2.5 seconds.
Thus, the pins are pulled on the reefing cutter s about one second after
initiation and disreef occurs 4 seconds later. The following calculations
take time zero to be the point of paraloon inflation valve ignition. Thus,
the initiation signal occurs at t = 0 seconds.
The reefed opening force is calculated as follows at t = 1. a second:
{Cd 5)1' = 4.25 ft2, equivalent drag area, reefed,
q = 440 lb/ ft 2
XK = 1.50 opening shock factor, reefed.
F o = (4. 25)(400)(1. 50) = 2,800 poundsl'
Total drag (paraloon plus vehicle) during the 4 second reefed de-
celeration period depends on how much of the paraloon is blanked by the
vehicle body. Effective drag of the 180 degree trimmed recovery body
with reefed paraloon laid back along the side is estimated to be 6.9 ft 2 .
The offset drag of the paraloon will rotate the vehicle to a new trim
position near 110 degrees (calculated in the following pages) resulting
in a higher total drag. However, for conservatism, reefed deceleration
is calculated using the 6.9 ft2 drag area.
Disreef shock is calculated to be
XK = 1. 0 at dlsreef
q = 240 lb/ ft2 at 15,700 ft
(Cd5)0 = 25. a ft2
= (1.0){240)(25)
= 6000 pounds at t = 5. a seconds
The vehicle then decelerates for an addltional 10 seconds, slowing to a
velocity of 199 feet per second at an altitude of 12,850 feet at w'J.ich
time the parachute is deployed.
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2.3.2.2 Parachute Deployment
The paraloon is released at this point by firing the inner (7 gr / ft)
FLSC charge. The paraloon then deploys the 35 foot extended skirt
recovery parachute to full line stretch. Assuming negligible vehicle
velocity change in this interval, time to deploy the parachute to full
line strentch is 1. 6 seconds.
The differential velocity generated between paraloon and vehicle
in this time is approximately 75.0 fps. Assuming the full mass of
the paraloon and parachute to be accelerated once again to vehicle
speed, the snatch force generated in the suspension lines to absorb
this differential kinetic energy is conservatively calculated as
1010 pounds.
This assumes the paraloon remains attached to the chute. In the
actual system, the parachute vent lines are tied to the deployment bag
and paraloon with a 200 pound line which is broken at snatch, so this
snatch force is never fully realized.
The following is a table of the parachute inflation dynamic s
calculated in accordance with the procedures in the USAF Parachute
Handbook. An iterative computer program was employed to select
the reefing ratio which yields the favorable reefed opening shock and
full open shock given below. Time at beginning of parachute inflation
is taken as t = 16.6 seconds.
Time Event Force q
(lb) (psi)
16.6 Full line stretch 31.8
16. 8 Reefed inflation 1582 31.0
20.6 Disreef 939 11.5
21. 4 Max. opening force 1968 7.72
23.2 Chute full open 990 1. 28
24.6 Terminal velocity 746 0.96
Altitude
(ft)
12,530
11,740
11,690
Velocity
(fps)
199
38.5
33.4
The calculations employed a total parachute drag area of 775 ft 2
which assumes a drag coefficient of 0.8 for the 35 foot diameter
10 percent flat extended skirt chute. Initial reefed drag area was taken
as 50 ft2 with a final area of 81 ft2 before disreef. Based upon the
design parameters and geometry of the parachute, the correct reefing
line length is selected from Fig. 4-86 in the USAF Parachute Handbook,
December '63 and is established as 14. 03 feet.
In general, it was felt that the 0.8 drag coefficient assumed would
be easily achieved with the lighter weights yielding terminal velocities
below 25 fps. At the heavier weights this value may decrease to 0.75
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thus yielding slightly higher than spec terminal velocities in the 736
pound range. Rather than arbitrarily build a bigger parachute in a
worst case assumption, the 35 foot size will establish its own
particular characteristics.
2.3.3 Decelerator System Performance Summary
Table 1 is a summary of the performance of the paraloon and
parachute systems. In addition to the recovery phase for the limit
load case (736 pound re-entry body, 90 degree launch, 180 degree
trim), data for recovery of the lightest RIB is also tabulated (336
pound, 90 degree launch, 180 degree trim).
2.4 Stress Analysis
U sing the loads indicated in the "Preliminary Design and Analysis
Report," a stress analysis of the recovery system structure was per-
formed. The philosophy of the analysis was to obtain the maximum
strength from the material involved utilizing the minimum material
thicknes s nece s sary. thus producing an adequate, yet efficient
structure.
The recovery system structure consists mainly of rings, inter-
connected cylinders, and circular plates fastened together by conven-
tional hardware, welding or by interlocked bearing surfaces. Due to
the highly redundant nature of the major structural components,
conservative assumptions were made in an effort to minimize analysis
time and insure structural integrity. Where practical, exact solutions
were obtained. The stress analysis contained in the "Preliminary
Design and Analysis Report" will not be repeated in this report.
The analysis was conducted with the assumption that the entire
recovery system structure is at a temperature of 400 0 F when the re-
entry loads are applied. Appropriate material strength reduction
factors were taken from MIL-HDBK-5 and applied. In all cases
the factors utilized assumed the material was at a temperature of
400 0 F for one-half hour.
A factor of safety of 1. 5 was applied to the design loads in order
to determine the ultimate design loads or stresses. Correspondingly,
a factor of safety of 1.0 was applied for the design loads or yield
stresses. However, in all cases the margin of safety was shown to
be positive for the load or stress involved.
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Margin of Safety =
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2.5 Electrical System
The electrical system as initially proposed was a relatively simple
system utilizing pyrotechnic switches and other highly reliable devices.
During the course of the program, requirements were instituted which
evolved into the somewhat complex, relatively sophisticated redundant
system presently utilized.
As an example, initially only one lanyard switch was to be utilized,
the timers were "g" switch actuated and the time delay and relay func-
tions were performed by a variety of pyrotechnic switches and a limited
amount of status checks could be performed.
The present design is completely redundant, including dual lanyard
switch assemblies. The pyrotechnic switches have been replaced by a
series of relays and time delays allowing the unit to be completely
checked and exercised prior to a flight.
A complete description of the present control system was presented
in Section 1.4.
3.0 DEVELOPMENT TESTING
Many tests have been conducted during the program in an attempt
to verify the design integrity of the recovery system. U sing the design
criteria initially given and that generated during the design and develop-
ment phase of this project, a variety of tests were conceived and
performed.
The tests performed ranged from component selection and evaluation
through prototype system tests with a complete recovery system. This
section describes the tests performed, the manner in which they were
conducted, the results and conclusions.
3.1 Structural Integrity Tests
Several tests were conducted on the recovery system structure
simulating the maximum design loads expected from the deployment
of the paraloon and of the parachute. The structure was firmly mounted
to a test fixture and all loads were applied hydraulically.
The maximum design load due to the paraloon is 6000 pounds, which
occurs when the skirt of the paraloon is disreefed. Correspondingly, a
maximum load of 2000 pounds is applied to the structure during dis-
reefing of the parachute. For the paraloon, the maximum design loads
were applied along the axial and transverse axes and at an oblique angle,
thus simulating the various attitudes at which the loads may be applied.
Parachute loads were applied in the axial direction only.
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In the initial phase of the program, a prototype structure was
fabricated and subjected to a series of structural tests in order to sub-
stantiate the preliminary stress analysis calculations. After these
initial tests, the structure was modified and again subjected to a series
of structural tests. For the final tests, dial indicators were utilized to
measure the deflection at various points of the structure.
The initial tests consisted of axial and transverse pull test for the
paraloon fittings and axial tests for the parachute fittings. The second
set of tests were conducted in the axial, transverse and oblique directions,
respectively, for the modified paraloon fitting only. Between tests, the
paraloon fitting was modified by reducing the cross section of, and
segmenting the prototype split ring into twelve separate tiedowns.
The initial test conducted on the parachute fitting was successful.
The fitting was later modified significantly, reducing internal structural
stresses to a minimum value. Pull testing of the modified fitting was
considered unnecessary in view of the results of the initial tests and of
the lower stresses anticipated.
3,1.1 Paraloon Structural Tests
The recovery system was mounted to the test fixture. Axial loads
of 6000 and 9000 pounds were applied using a simulated paraloon bridle
with twelve tie-down points. Each tie-down point was considered evenly
loaded due to the symmetry.
The recovery system structure was then removed and remounted in
order to apply the load along the transver se axis.
Again, the 6000 pound load was applied twice, but with only three
of the 12 tie-down points in tension. This could be expected if actual
disreefing would occur while the vehicle was at an angle of attack of
90 degrees.
Observation of the structure during the test, and post-test inspection
did not disclose any indication of a permanent set or excessive strain.
This concluded the prototype testing of the paraloon fitting. The
structure was then modified as previously described and retested using
dial indicator s to mea sure deflec tions. See figur e s 3, 4, and 5.
3.1. 2 Parachute Structure Tests
The paraloon structure was removed from the prototype recovery
system, exposing the parachute fittings. Simulated parachute risers
were fabricated for the test and installed to simulate parachute
operation during descent.
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Figure 3. Paraloon Axial Pull Test
Figure 4. Para100n Transverse Pull Test
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Figure 5. Paraloon Oblique Pull Te st
For the first test, both parachute fittings were utilized, with an
axial load of 2000 pounds. After that test, one of the parachute riser
lines was disconnected and the load was again applied to just one fitting.
See figure 6.
A post-test inspection revealed that the structure capability was
much greater than the applied load. No indication of yielding was
evident and all components were within tolerance.
Later, the parachute fitting was redesigned and moved aft in the
structure. A retest was considered unnecessary due to the results of
the initial test and the obvious improvement made by the modification.
3.1.3 Structural Pressurization Tests
Internal pressurization tests were conducted to establish the
adequacy of the sealing techniques on the forward bulkhead and
cylindrical sidewalls. A design requirement was established that
the recovery system must be sealed so that during flight no gases
will escape. Initially, the two hatches of the recovery system were
provided with a 70 Shore A Durometer gasket. A fillet of Dow
Corning Silastic 732 RTV waS applied around the doubler on the inside
of the skin of the test vehicle. Each rivet of the doubler was also
coated with the RTV to provide sealing.
A test fixture consisting of a concave aft bulkhead of 0.090 inch
thick 6061-T6 aluminum welded to a mating ring was fabricated to
simulate the forward bulkhead. A liberal amount of silicone grease
was applied to the O-ring of the fixture mating ring and the ring was
installed as the separation ring of the recovery system. Pressuriza-
tion of the unit was provided through a valve welded to the fixture
bulkhead.
For each test, the system was pressurized to the desired
pressure and immersed in a tank of water to inspect for leakage.
A total of four tests were conducted.
During the fourth test, the unit was pressurized to 15 psig for
15 minutes. The unit was completely airtight except for a slight
leakage at two rivets of a hatch doubler.
As a result of the tests, the hatch gaskets of 0.090 inch thick
by 0.375 inch wide 50 Shore A Durometer silicone rubber were
incorporated into the final design. The O-ring seal on the test
fixture was considered adequate. Positive sealing of each u:lit was
exhibited during the Acceptance Tests prior to delivery.
It should be noted that the
did not invert under pressure.
0.090 inch thick concave bulkhead
A similar bulkhead of 0.090 inch
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Figure 6. Parachute Axial Pull Te st
thick 6061-T6 aluminum is incorporated into the design of the recovery
system as the forward bulkhead, to conform to the design criteria of a
15 psig pressure differential from either side.
The stress analysis indicated a positive margin of safety for the
forward bulkhead with an external pressure tending to invert it. This
was substantiated during the pressurization tests.
3.2 Flexible Linear Shaped Charge (FLSC) Separation Systems
Preliminary testing was initiated utilizing past experience gained
from similar separation systems incorporated on previous programs.
In the initial design phase of the separation system s, it was decided
to update the FLSC to be used with the latest, most efficient FLSC
available, Ensign-Bickford Company's Configuration IV shape with RDX
explosive. After the new FLSC was purchased and testing commenced,
considerable difficulty was experienced in initiating the new FLSC.
Many back-initiation methods were attempted with varying degrees of
success at a sacrifice of ease of installation and reliability. A reliable
technique for back initiation was derived, which, however, required
local flattening of the basic FLSC shape. This procedure was deemed
unsatisfactory from the standpoint of production reliability, and testing
was continued. After considerable investigation, tests, and discussions
with vendors, a satisfactory initiation system was developed which
utilizes a detonator with a Single ruggedized bridgewire, Cook PIN
600190. A basic feature of the separation system is that the detonator
is positioned normal to one side of the V of the FLSC, hence the term
"side initiation." This technique presents a larger target area of the
FLSC for the detonator blast, and couples the energy much more
efficiently than attempting to back initiate on the symmetrical axis of
the FLSC cross section (i. e., on the point of the V).
The design of the recovery system incorporates two independent
separation systems, each consisting of a circumferential length of
flexible linear shaped charge (FLSC) and two independent detonators.
Two detonators are provided as good design practice in order to
insure a high level of reliability through redundancy, with each
detonator in a separate control system.
The following sections describe the two separation systems.
3.2.1 Separation System FLSC
Separation occurs at a specified time during flight, controlled by
the programmer timers or by a TIM command. Power is normally
applied via a timer in the recovery system which activates the
detonators which, in turn, initiate the FLSC, separating the payload
from the rocket.
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The FLSC selected is manufactured by the Ensign Bickford Company
of Simsbury, Connecticut. It has a 15 grift RDX explosive core encased
in a Configuration IV chevron shaped lead sheath. The FLSC itself is
contained in a chevron shaped Teflon jacket which is designed to provide
the optimum stand-off distance for best cutting capability. Also, the
insulating qualities of the Teflon allow a higher temperature pulse
environment than unprotected FLSC could tolerate. The FLSC assembly,
Ensign Bickford Company piN 205026 consists of the Teflon backup strip,
PIN 204004 and the FLSC, PIN 206033. The FLSC itself is designated
as a thin-wall FLSC having the performance characteristics of a 15 grift
core loading with the dimensions of a 10 grift FLSC.
The separation ring has a total thickness of 0.100 inch of aluminum
alloy 6061-T6 at the separation plane. Utilizing the Ensign Bickford
Company data sheets, the FLSC has a 0.99999 reliability at a 90 percent
confidence level for severing a 0.125 inch thick specimen when a standoff
of 0.032 inch is utilized. The FLSC selected is more than adequate to
assure the required separation function.
3.2.2 Parachute Deployment System FLSC
The FLSC utilized for parachute deployment is also manufactured
by the Ensign Bickford Company, and is their piN 206003. It consists
of a 7 grift RDX explosive core loading, also encased in a Configuration
IV chevron shaped lead sheath. The FLSC is used to sever a 0.050 inch
thick ring of aluminum alloy 2024-T35J.
Statistical data is scare pertaining to the reliability of a 7 grift
RDX FLSC severing this alloy with the specified thickness. However,
one manufacturer claims that a maximum cut of 0.090 inch is possible.
Statistical data does exist, however, for aluminum alloy 606J-T6.
In referring to the Ensign Bickford data, the FLSC has a reliability
of 0.99999 at a confidence level of 90 percent with a standoff of O. 026
inch to sever a O. 064 inch thickness of aluminum alloy 6061-T6.
Assuming that a "scaling" based on the shear strength of the materials
can be utilized, the FLSC will sever and have the same reliability for
a O. 048 inch thickness of aluminum alloy 2024-T351 at room temper-
ature. Since the actual thickness is O. 050 inch and the ring will be at
an elevated temperature during separation, a high reliability exists
for complete severance.
3.2.3 Detonators
A total of four detonator s are used in each recovery system. Each
of the two separation systems utilizes two detonators spaced 180 degrees
apart, with the butted ends of the FLSC located 90 degrees from the
detonators.
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The detonators are similar in explosive charge and internal
geometry to the ruggedized detonator presently used in the Capache
separation system. Both types of detonators contain a single bridge
wire, with 100 mg of lead azide as the primer. 200 mg of RDX
explosive is used for the main charge of the separation detonators,
and 150 mg for the parachute deploy detonators. They are designated
as Cook PIN 600190-001 and -003, respectively. The mounting
threads and connector of the two are different to prevent inadvertent
cross installation or cross connection.
During installation, the Teflon jacket is removed from the 15 grift
FLSC in the area under the detonator to assure initiation of the FLSC.
Both strands of FLSC are cemented in place to prevent shifting in the
groove.
In the later stages of the program, a detonator bridge wire sensi-
tivity problem developed where if both detonators were wired in parallel
to fire simultaneously, one of the detonators would malfunction leaving
the skin material opposite the detonator intact. Also, a detonator in
close proximity (such as the parachute deployment detonator) would
lose continuity due to the shock of the nearby separation detonation.
This problem was resolved by contacting the vendor and specifying a
detonator with a more ruggedized bridge wire.
Subsequent tests to date have revealed that the latest detonators,
Cook PIN 600190-001 and -003. are adequately ruggedized to survive
the shock spectrum encountered.
3.2.4 Separation System Tests
During the early part of the program, extensive FLSC initiation
and separation tests have been conducted. These tests were reported
in detail in the "Final Design and Analysis Report," and will not be
reported here. The following discussion pertains exclusively to tests
conducted subsequent to that report.
The tests conducted include a series of initiation tests where a
detonator test block is utilized in order to verify the initiation
technique. The other tests cond cted utilized the prototype structure
in order to test the complete separation system, including the
detonator initiation reliability.
In each of the tests, the same FLSC was utilized. However,
several detonators were initially selected for evaluation before
finalizing on the presently used detonator. These are listed below.
1. Hercules Powder Company piN D 119FO. 100 mg Lead
Azide and 100 mg RDX
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2. Holex PIN 7305, Cook piN 600140-003, 100 mg Lead
Azide, 200 mg RDX
3. Hole piN 7899, Cook PIN 600190-001, 100 mg Lead
Azide, 200 mg RDX.
The results of these tests are summarized in table 2.
3.2.5 Parachute Deployment System Tests
In a similar fashion, many FLSC separation tests for parachute
deployment have been conducted. This repor 1 will consider only
those tests conducted subsequent to those reported in detail in the
"Preliminary Design and Analysis Report." In that document, these
tests were called "Paraloon Separation FLSC Tests, " and were
presented in Table HI.
For each of the subsequent tests, the same (prototype) FLSC was
used, 7 grift RDX Configuration IV FLSC, Ensign Bickford piN 20600'
This separation system is similar in design to that used for separat:o.. ,
two detonators are used, spaced 180 degrees apart on the circum-
ferential charge, with one detonator electrically driven by the "A"
control system and the other by the "B" system.
The detonator finally selected presently utilized for this function
is designated as Cook PIN 600190-003. The "side initiation" technique
discussed in Section 3.2 is used again here.
Table 3 summarizes both systems tests and initiation tests using
small detonator blocks machined to duplicate the designed FLSC-
detonator interface.
The detonators tested are listed below.
1. Hercules Powder Co., piN Dl19FO, mg Lead Azide
and 100 mg RDX
2. Holex piN 7899, Cook PIN 600190-003, 100 mg Lead
Azide with 150 mg RDX.
3.3 Paraloon Tests
Several tests were conducted in order to prove the adequacy of the
paraloon design. The tests were designed to simulate the actual flight
environment as nearly as practical. The tests included the sequence
of events of paraloon deployment given below:
A. Cover ejection and inflation
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B. Operation under flight conditions
C. Pr e s surization
A brief description of each test is given in the following sections.
3.3. 1 Cover Ejection and Inflation Te sts
Cover ejection tests were perfortTIed to detTIonstrate the capability
of the inflating paraloon to forcibly retTIove the paraloon cover for
deploytTIent and inflate. This technique has been successfully utilized
many times on previous programs to remove the paraloon cover and
deploy the paraloon.
The operation is essentially that of inflating a paraloon restricted
in a comparttTIent. When enough force is generated, 20 No.6 screws
are sheared, thus releasing the cover and allowing the paraloon to
continue to inflate.
A paraloon tTIinus the drag skirt was fabricated for the tests. For
each test, the recovery system was assetTIbled and the paraloon packed
into the cOtTIpartment provided.
The design of the recovery systetTI has the paraloon cover attached
to the extension ring which is in turn fastened to the paraloon separation
ring with shear screws. The revised stress analysis shows that the 36
No. 8 screws at the interface connection of the paraloon cover to the
extension ring yield a tTIargin of safety in shear of 1. 24 against re-
entry design pressure loads. PritTIarily, past experience dictated the
use of 20 No.6 shear screws for the fastening of the packing ring to
the recovery systetTI structure. The utilization of 20 shear screws
allow the paraloon to build up pressure, remove the cover and to
rapidly inflate during deploytnent. Thescrews used have an ultitTIate
strength in single shear of 382 pounds at 400 0 F and 510 pounds at
rootTI temperature. This requires a total force of 7640 pounds at
400 0 F to shear 20 screws and eject the cover, but 10,200 pounds at
50 0 F at which tetTIperature the ground tests were conducted. The
area of the paraloon cover is approxitTIately 200 square inches, so
the gas pressure required to shear the screws is a nOtTIinal 50 psi
at the test tetTIperature.
A 225 cubic inch reservoir and tTIanifold was assetTIbled to the
recovery system for test purposes. Since this is approxitTIately
3.2 times the prototype bottle volutTIe, the reservoir was pressurized
with nitrogen to 1100 psig and tTIated to the test fixture. The nitrogen
was to be released into the paraloon by activiating a solenoid valve.
The first test occurred on 6 July 1967 (see figures 7 and 8)
approxitTIately one second after release of the nitrogen, the paraloon
cover was ejected approxitTIately 50 feet into the air. The paraloon
inflated to about 1 psig in about 5-6 seconds.
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Figure 8. Paraloon Inflated After Test
The 20 shear screws sheared as expected but the total elapsed time
to fill the para loon was more than expected. The long fill time was
attributed to the relatively low pressure differential of the initial impulse
and the length and smalliD of the tube connecting the reservoir to the
paraloon.
Past experience has shown that a properly sized re servoir
pressurized to about 3000 psig and located close to the paraloon will
give "working form" to a paraloon in about 1.0 to 1.5 seconds.
Normally, a 16 to 17 psia paraloon pre s sure pr es ents excellent
deployment characteristics at deployment altitude.
The second test was a repeat of the first, and occured on the same
day with similar results. The capability of the inflating paraloon to
eject the paraloon cover and deploy itself was satisfactorily
demonstrated.
A third cover deployment test was conducted on 14 December
1967 to simulate the actual paraloon deployment conditions during re-
entry except for the heating environment. Provision for measuring
the deflection of the center structure during paraloon pressure buildup
prior to shearing of the cover screws and the total time from the
releasing of the nitrogen in the reservoir until the cover is ejected.
was included.
Three cover shear screws were added at a 120 degree spacing to
simulate a "q" load of 1530 pounds on the paraloon cover during deploy-
ment at an angle of attack of 180 degrees, which is twice the 750 pound
load actually anticipated at deployment. A rigid member was attached
to the center of the underside of the paraloon attachment plate. with
the forward end just contacting a pad of beeswax mounted to the forward
bulkhead to measure the total deflection of the parachute cover and
inner structure during deployment. In addition to the above, a pair of
small Winchester connectors, acting as switches, were positioned
180 degrees apart on the paraloon cover with the circuit connected to
a two-channel brush recorder.
The same 225 cubic inch reservoir with a solenoid operated valve
was used but the fill line length was reduced to about 24 inches. The
reservoir was pressurized to 1100 psig.
When the nitrogen in the reservoir was released. the cover was
ejected approximately 50 feet into the air. The total elapsed time of
0.5 second from application of power until cover removal was indi-
cated by both channels of the Brush recorder. Time to full shape
was approximately 2.0 seconds. A total deflection of 0.1 inch was
indicated by the impression left in the beeswax pad. No permanent
deflection of any structure waS detected after the test. The para loon
was pressurized to 21 psia after stabilization.
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The main purpose of the test was to measure the deflections of the
parachute cover and the forward deck which act together. Since this
was demonstrated to be only 0.1 inch, the stresses involved are not
critical. The parachute cover in the final design has a minimum
thickness of 0.090 inch while the forward deck has a 0.093 inch
thickness.
The reactive force which generated this deflection is calculated
to be 11,730 pounds, which is the ultimate single shear force for the
39 shear screws employed in this test. This force far exceeds any
of the other axial force on the inner structure during launch, re-entry
or recovery. Thus the adequacy of the central structure design has
been conclusively demonstrated.
3.3.2 Bong Drop Tests
Two drop tests of the paraloon were performed at Bong AFB on
13 September. The drop vehicle was a boiler plate version of a 6
caliber cone cylinder (03-2) weighing 375 pounds with a CG 3.72
diameters from the nose. In the first test, the para loon was pre-
inflated to 2.0 psig with the skirt reefed. The vehicle was suspended
beneath a helicopter by a nose lug with the paraloon down (see
figure 9). The drop was made at an altitude of 1100 feet, with the
vehicle reoriented nose up. Disreef occurred at 4 seconds. The
terminal velocity was about 110 fps, and oscillations were in the
range of ±10-20 degrees.
Test No.2 was intended to confirm stability and terminal condi-
tions; the paraloon skirt was not reefed. The vehicle was dropped
in the horizontal attitude from 1200 feet above ground. Terminal
conditions were identical to Test No.1.
3.3.3 Pressurization Test
A prototype paraloon was designed and fabricated for the test,
which was conducted on 8 September 1967. In order to assure a
proper design, the paraloon was given a proof pressure test which
consisted of pressurizing the paraloon to 10 psig, and holding for a
period of 10 minutes. During this time there was a pressure drop
to 9.75 psig, which is considered not significant. An actual leak
would have resulted in a greater pressure drop. This proof pressure
is 1.75 times the maximum design overpressure of 5.74 psig. During
recovery, the paraloon is utilized for only 15 secons. and therefore
the 10 minute test period was considered more than adequate.
3.4 Parachute Tests
Two parachute drop tests were conducted utilizing the boiler-
plate test vehicle and a packed parachute installed on the prototype
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recovery system. The tests were conducted at the Richard Bong
Recreation Area located in Kenosha County, Wisconsin. A Brantly
helicopter was chartered to conduct the tests.
The boilerplate test vehicle was fabricated from commercial grade
steel into a 3:1 cone plus a 3:1 cylinder configuration. Ballast was
added for a total weight of 362 pounds with the prototype recovery
system installed. The center of gravity was located at a point 52 inches
from the aft end for the drop presenting an extreme forward c. g. condition.
The first test was conducted with the vehicle being launched from a
horizontal stationary position at an altitude of 2500 feet above ground
level. The vehicle had a 4.7 second free fall from the helicopter at
2500 feet altitude to achieve a velocity of about 150 fps (q = 26.8 psi).
At the end of 4.7 seconds (controlled by pyro-delay cutters). the para-
chute was deployed by a 3 foot diameter pilot parachute. The 35 foot
extended skirt canopy was reefed for 4 seconds, and then successfully
disreefed. Due to high wind drift, and distance from the observers to
the ground impact point, only approximate measurements of terminal
velocity were achieved. An estimated terminal velocity of approxi-
mately 30 feet per second was attained by measuring the time interval
of the final 150 feet of descent with a drop line attached to the vehicle.
The chute functioned perfectly in every respect and incurred no damage
whatsoever. Oscillation was about ±10 degrees. The deployment bag
and pilot chute separated from the main canopy apex and were not
recovered.
The test deployment dynamic pressure of 26+ psf compares to a
maximum expected operational q of 31.7 psf, and is considered good
preliminary verification of design.
The second parachute drop test was conducted in an attempt to
obtain a more accurate terminal velocity measurement. Again, the
vehicle was dropped from an altitude of 2500 feet. The chute was
rigged for static line deployment rather than using a pilot chute as
employed previously. Due to a tight line stow loop in the deployment
bag, the static line break tie snapped before all the lines were deployed.
The drop vehicle was destroyed and most of the prototype R/5 structure
was distorted so as to be useless for further testing.
Despite the tight line stow loops, the parachute would have deployed
properly had a pilot chute been used as in the first test, rather than a
static/break line. A subsequent pull test on the tight loop indicated an
approximate force of 40-50 pounds to pull the line bundle free. A 3.0
foot pilot chute such as used previotisly would generate an extraction
force in excess of 50 pounds with a q of 10 psf (91 fps) which would be
surpas sed in about 2.5 seconds of free fall.
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The deployment bag was redesigned so that the stow loops are more
carefully controlled dimensionally. The loops and panel locks have also
been increased in size to accomrnodale the larger 200 pound suspension
lines now being used.
3.5 Control System Tests
During the course of the development program, the control system
evolved into the present reliable form through a series of tests evaluating
com ponents and eventually exerci sing the completed prototype control
system. The following sections discuss the finalized components of the
control system, the simulator and Checkout Unit developed for factory
testing the control systems, and the testing of the finalized prototype
control system.
3.5.1 Component Evaluation and Tests
This section summarizes the more significant results of the
development testing performed on components and subassemblies of
the electrical control system.
3.5.1.1 Program Timer
The original program timer selected for use in the Aerobee 350
Recovery System was a 5 cam mechanical timer manufactured by
Acton Laboratories, Acton, Massachusetts, Model No. 4-2.3-5-640.
It was determined early in the program that Acton could not deliver
within cost or schedule, so their purchase order was canceled and
an order was placed with Datametrics, Inc., Waltham, Massachusetts
for a slightly modified version fo their Model 657 timer. The
Datametrics unit (see figure 10) is slightly larger than the Acton,
has six adjustable cams (three solid, three split), and operates on
12. Vdc. Complete specifications for the timer are contained on
Drawing 600100, some of which are:
a. Total timed duration up to 72.0 seconds (dial indication).
Total timed duration up to 760 seconds (actual 3600 cam
rotation) .
b. Accuracy:
At room temperature, from reset position, 12. Vdc
±l. 8 sec, 10-72.0 sec range.
At -150 F to +140 0 F, from reset, 12. Vdc ±2. V,
±7. 2. sec ± 1 '10 of setting.
c. Life - 1000 hours under stated environmental conditions.
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d. Switching capability: 28 Vdc, 7 amps resistive, 40 amp
surge current.
The Datametrics timers were received and timing accuracies were
checked out to be well within spec. Test results yield a timer accuracy
of ±O. 5 percent of full scale (720 seconds) plus ±O. 5 percent os setting
over the temperature range of -15 0 F to +140 0 F and input voltages from
10 to 14 Vdc. Thus, for a 400 second mission within these environmental
ranges, accuracy will be ±3. 5 sec plus ±2. 0 sec for a total expected
variation of ±5. 5 seconds. However, time variation with temperature is
a regular, not random, function, i. e., at 1400 F, the timer repeatability
error is actualy ±O. 20 percent or less, as it is at room temperature.
Thus, if timer temperature during flight is known, temperature effects
compensation can be applied to practically eliminate timing errors.
From this it can be seen that the timing accuracy is about a factor
of 2 to I better than specified. The following table lists timing
accuracies achieved on SiN 4 timer at various temperature-voltage
conditions. The timer was initially set to the full 760 second position.
Subsequent tests were from the reset position.
Time (sec) at Specified Temperature
Input Voltage Room 1400 F 1800 F Room -300 F -150 F
10 Vdc 760 766 759 751 754
14 Vdc 758 766 767 759 751
In the 2-10 second range the above test was repeated. The timer IS
initially set to 2.4 seconds and subsequent tests are run from the
electrical reset position.
Input Voltage Room
Time (sec) at Temperature
10 Vdc
14 Vdc
2.40
2.40
2.50
2.25 2.00
2.50
2.20
2.60
2.65
2.65
The basic version of this timer. the Datametrics Model 657, has
been qualified to environments well in excess of those of the Aerobee
350 R/S.
As stated in another section. the program timer was mounted to
the test structure during the FLSC testing and has survived without
damage, except for a uniform shift of one second in the actuation
time of all switches due to takeup of mechanical slack in a common
mounting screw.
Figure 11 is a photograph of the prototype/breadboard electrical
control system with the two timers. Referring once more to Fig. 10,
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counting from the left side, cam s I, 3, and 4 are solid with a single
detent point and thus create only momentary closures in switches I, 3.
and 4. Switches 1 and 4 provide motor control; timer shutoff of 4,
runout and reset on 1. Switch 2 provides power to the payload com-
mond and programmed mode circuits as early as 5 seconds after first
movement. Switch 3 is timer status. The width of the detent slot in
the cam provides about 5-6 seconds of dwell for the switch buttons.
The split cams 5 and 6 provide the desired time delay for the separation
switch signals in the "A" and "B tr circuits.
To adjust the cams, the cover must be removed from the timer,
and the cam gear must be released from the cam shaft by loosening its
clamp hub. The end of the cam shaft is then rotated with a screwdriver
and the individual cams locked into the desired positions by set screws
in the cam faces.
3.5.1. 2 Event Marker Circuit
The event marker circuit originally designed and breadboarded
was based upon a successful unit Cook has used previously. However,
the total usable pulse length of the event marker was determined to be
effectively less than the 200 milliseconds necessary for reliable time
sharing on a commutated TM channel. The circuit was redesigned to
increase the time constant so that a usable pulse width of 2 seconds is
achieved.
3.5.1.3 FLSC Shock Environment Tests
In conjunction with the FLSC cutting tests, all the electrical com-
ponents intended for use in the control system were hard mounted to
the test structure to determine their ability to withstand the explosive
shock. During the four initial 15 grain FLSC tests, the components
tested were:
Aneroid - Aeromechanisrns
Relay - Potter-Brumfield
Relay - Babcock
Relay - Potter -Brum fie ld
Time Delay Switch - Jay EI Co.
Timer - Acton Industries
Fuses - Picofuse
(Littelfuse Inc.)
Resistor
Switch (snap action)
Model No. 910
Model No. TLl7DB
Model No. BR 18AX -D4- V3
Model No. SC IIDB
Model No. 10166
Model No. 4-23-10
Model No. 275001
MIL RN 60
MS 25348-1
The Potter-Brumfield TLl7DB failed just from the shock of the
detonator alone, i. e., an open contact that would not close. A later
test of the same model wherein the FLSC functioned normally,
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severely damaged the 1nterior structure of the T L17DB. The Babcock
relay was undamaged and did not actuate due to shock.
An unpotted Jay El time delay sW1tch broke a capacitor lead inter-
nally on one test. The potted units to be used in the flight hardware
survived without any change.
The aneroid changed setting by 4000 feet in one test due to loose
housing screws.
On 1 January 1968, the preliminary system test was performed
wherein the 15 grain FLSC, explosive air valve, and 7 grain FLSC
were detonated in sequence. In conjunction with the above, the
following electrical components were mounted to the structure as
indicated:
1 Aneroid - Aero Mechamsms, Model 9010 -
mounted to the ins1de of an installed access atc •
2 Time Delay Switches - Jay El, Model 10166 -
mounted to a slmulated control deck shock mounted on
the front of the chute compartment.
2 Relays - Babcock, BR191AX-D3-V3 -
mounted to same deck as the time delay switches.
1 Timer - Datametrics, Cook pIN 600100, SIN 002 -
mounted to parachute compartments.
The timer and relays were exercised after each of the three explosive
events.
The time delay switches and the relays were unaffected by all
explosive shock tests and operated normally before a d after each
tes t.
The anero1d shifted its opening and closing settings during the
test by about 3500 feet. Inspection revealed that the three case
assembly screws were slightly loosened, allowing switch movement
relative to the aneroid bellows.
The screws were tightened and the aneroid was rechecked '" the
vacuum camber. Th,s recahbration yielded switch opening at
24,800 feet a d closure at 19. 100 feet Wh1Ch is identical to its original
setting before the FLSC tests. All aneroid screws in the filght
hardware Wl11 be checked and secured with Locktite.
The Datametrics timer was unaffected except for a uniform one
second Sh1ft in all six sWItch trip times. This shift was due to the
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clearance takeup betwee'1 the switches and a common mounting screw
WhlCh passes through a hole in each of the switches.
3.5.1.4 Protective Fuses
It sometimes happens that bridgewire leads in electric detonators
will short to case ground or contact each other after successfully
igniting the explosive mixture. To prevent damage to the batteries
from such an occurrence, protective fuses have been incorporated in
each of the six detonator power lines. These fuses must provide the
desired degree of protection and yet not be so delicate or mar ginal in
their time-current blow characteristics that they might be blown pre-
maturely. Therefore care was exercised in the selection of the proper
fuse size. Also, the fuses are installed between the checkout connector
and the detonators so that the checkout current does not pass through
the fuses.
In the initial FLSC firing tests a Picofuse 275002 was used in
series with the detonator bridgewire. Fusing time of the detonators
ranges from 2.5 ms at 3.5 amperes for the CAD valve to 2.7 ms at
4.5 amperes for the Holex detonators, Cook PIN 600190. The
275002 fuse has a blow time of 50 ms at 4.5 amperes. With the
detonator bridgewire shorted, the 24 volt 1OV0500SP battery can
deliver a minimum short circuit current of about 9.6 amperes, which
indicates 1. 0 ohm of internal battery resistance at that current. Blow
time of the 275002 fuse at 9.6 amperes is about 5 ms.
The foregoing numbers indicate a sufficient time spread between
the 50 ms for the fuse and the 2.7 ms for the detonators. However,
since the batteries can certainly stand the short current of 9.6 amps
for more than the 5 m s blow time of the 275002 fuse, even longer
fusing times were investigated.
The fuse selected for use in the flight hardware is the high
reliability Picofuse 265004 which has a 25 millisecond blow time at
the 9.6 amperes mimmum short current. At the 4.5 amp firing
current level, the blow time of the 265004 is over 100 seconds.
3.5. 1.5 Detonator Simulation
In order to permit rapid, safe, and inexpensive f,"nctional testing
of the control system, it was decided to simulate the bridgewire action
of the detonators using fuses with the same current blow time
charac teri stic.
The following table lists the blow times of the basic electric
detonators used in the 350 Recovery System.
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Holex (Cook PIN 600190)
Flare Nort ern N S 105A
2.7 ms at 4.5 amp,
1. 0 ± O. 1 ohm
2.5 ms at 3.5 amp,
1. 15 ± 0.15 ohm s
A simple test setup quickly determined that a 3AG 1/2 fuse,
Littelfuse No. 312.500, has the required characteristics:
Resistance
Blow Time
1. 25 ohm s
4.5 ms at 5.6 amps
3.1 ms at 6.5 amps
The Simulator/Checkout box detailed in Section 3.5.2 of this report
utilizes 3AG 1/2 fuses to simulate the detonator bridgewire action of
all six circuits.
The use of these fuses permitted the repeated testing of the event
marker circuits to establish optimum biasing and pulse output. It was
also possible to repeatedly function the entire control system in
Automatic and Command Mode to show reliable performance, to
demonstrate that sympathetic relay actuation does not occur, and to
prove that the Jay El time delays will not short out or change timing
accuracy due to surges from the heavy firing current.
3.5.1.6 Time Delay Switches
Four R-C solid state time delay switches are used in the electrical
control system; Sl and S2 are 10 second lockouts to prevent premature
paraloon deployment by the aneroids after command separation, and
S3 and S4 are 15 second delay switches which automatically cause
parachute deployment 15 seconds after paraloon deployment.
The switches used are Jay El Products, Inc •• Model No. 10166-20,
Cook PIN 700574. The unit is foam potted and has passed all required
functional and shock tests. The time delay is a linear function of the
external resistance placed across contacts 1 and 2 of the switch.
Delays up to 36 seconds can be attained with a resistance of one meg-
ohm. Each switch varies slightly so that in order to achieve the most
accurate 10 and 15 second delay values, the resistors are hand
selected for each switch.
Functional testing of the full system has revealed no timing
variation in the time delay sWltches due to transients on the lines
when the detonators are fired.
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3.5.2 Factory Simulator and Checkout nit
For development and production testing, a combined conlrol system
simulator and checkout unit was constructed to:
a. PrOVide input stimuli to the control system to simulate lanyard,
timer, and aneroid switch closures.
b. Simulate command signal inputs from a simulated TM payload.
c. P'ovide fusible loads for the detonator circuits to simulate
their bndgewlr e action.
d. Monitor system status and performance. Provide quick
system cycling and reset capability.
e. Provide a proven piece of equipment for factory test of the
three deliverable systems.
Figure 12 shows the control panel of the Simulator/Checkout box. The
cables coming from the top of the unit terminate in connectors matching
those of the prototype control system, so that the box can be mated
anywhere in the system to simulate in input signal or monitor response.
Refernng again to figure 12, the functlOns of the various controls
can be described more or less in the order of a simulated mission.
Prior to launch, the status of the timers, lanyard switches. and
the normal command recovery relays can be monitored either through
the Pad Checkout mdicator lights (upper left) or the Blockhouse Status
indicator lig ts (lower left).
The relay reset control (cer.ter panel) operates through the pad
checkout connector.
Aneroid sta - s is indicated by the position of the switch handles
(lower right).
The sta s of the air bottle pressl-re or the separation indicator
jumper is presented on the microammeter (right center). The switch
to the left of the meter selects either the jOlned/ separation switch
(bottom center or the potentiometer simulating the pressure trans-
ducer (top center) to be displayed on the meter.
At the left center are located the six receptacles for the 3AG 1/2
fuses used to simulate the detonator bndgewires. Each of these is
wired in parallel with the indicator light above it, which turn on to
give a visual indication tbat the firing current has been applied.
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These stay lighted until the firing relay or switch has been reset. Below
these fuses are the TM command switches. These toggles are spring
loaded and are normally off.
If the program timers are not used, their switch action can be'
simulated by the 12 switch array at the lower left center of the panel.
The lights, A and B, indicate when power is being applied to the timer
mtors (i.e., through switches 51 and/or 54).
At liftoff, the lanyard switches are moved to the "Arm" position.
applying power to the timers (status lights go to red).
Approximately 3 seconds later, timer switches 52 and 53 close,
supplying power to the command circuits, and changing the timer
status lights to red (operating indication).
The aneroid toggle switches are flipped to simulate ascent
through the 19, 000 foot altitude level.
At the preset time, timer switches 55 and 56 close, fire the "A"
and "B" system separation detonators (fuses blow, indicator lights on).
The event marker output is most easily monitored on an oscilloscope
with a recording camera. If proper matching of the one megohm
impedance of the ECM can be achieved, a pen-recorder or oscillo-
graph can be used to provide a time-based record of the events.
Ten seconds after separation, time delay switches lA1A15l and
lAlA152 close and actuate relays 1AlAlK3 and lA1A1K4. The normal
recovery status lights switch to red.
The aneroid simulator switches are flipped to the "Below" position
to indicate passage through 19. 000 feet altitude. The "A" and "B"
paraloon detonators (fuses) blow (indicator lights on).
Fifteen seconds after paraloon deployment, time delay switches
lAlA153 and 54 close, actuatmg relays K13 and K14. These supply
firing current to the parachute deployment detonators (indicator lights
on, fuses blow).
Timers shut off; timer current (upper right meter) goes to zero.
Timers run out and reset (swltch, upper right corner).
Command mode can be interjected into this procedure to command
separation, paraloon deploy, and/or parachute deploy. The 10 second
interlock (delay) provided by time delay switches 51 and 52 and be
demonstrated by flipping the aneroid switches to "Below" prior to
10 seconds after command separation; the paraloon detonators will not
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fire until after the 10 second delay actuates relays K3 and K4. However,
the command paraloon deployment switch closure will fire the paraloon
detonators any time after command separation.
3.5.3 Simulated System Tests
After the electrical system simulator/checkout box was completed,
complete control system tests were performed as follows. Figure 13
is a photograph of the test setup.
1. Prelaunch status checks and reset of all relays were per-
formed through side checkout connector and blockhouse
umbilical connector.
2. With the simulator box switches performing the timer cam
functions, the following sequence was repeatedly
demonstrated:
a. Lanyard switch connection of power to the timer motor
circuit at first motion.
b. Arming of control system after 6 second lockout.
c. Separation signal to outer skin detonators. Power from
on-board batteries routed through firing relays, pro-
tective fuses and arming plug to initiate (simulated
detonator brige wires. Bridge wires were simulated
with 3AG 1/2 fuses with similar blow time/ current
characteri stic s.
d. 10 second time delays (51 and 52) functioned on time,
actuating K3, K4.
e. Either and/ or both aneroid switche s were functioned
(simulator switch action) and in all cases both "A"
and "B" system paraloon valve detonator s fire
successfully. As in (c), detonator bridge wires
were simulated by 3AG fuses.
f. 15 seconds after aneroid switch closure, 53 and 54
functioned, actuating K13, K14. These, in turn,
successfully fired the parachute deployment "A"
and "B" detonator s (simulated).
g. Event marker outputs were scope-monitored and
photographed, yielding 2 second usable pulses.
h. Command override signals for separation and
paraloon deployment were fed in through the
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forward payload connector (1 PI) and all subsequent functions
were performed satisfactorily. The Sl and S2 time delay
switches prevented automatic paraloon deployment by aneroid
for 10 seconds after command separation.
The above tests were then repeated using the Datametrics program
timers. The simulator was used to provide lanyard switch arming and
aneroid switch closure. The timers performed satisfactorily and were
run out and reset repeately during the exercise.
3.6 Recovery System Tests
Several systems tests were conducted. The first test was per-
formed in order to evaluate the recovery sequence and its effect on
selected prototype electromechanical components mounted to the
recovery system structure.
The second and third tests conducted were full systems tests
utilizing the completed recovery system, SiN 003. All of the com-
ponents with the exception of the paraloon and parachute were installed.
The mas s of the parachute was simulated, however, by packing fabric
in the parachute compartment to an equal density. The test was con-
ducted by pulling the lanyards, allowing both control systems to function
in the programmed mode. Appropriate safety considerations were in-
corporated allowing manual control of the aneroid switches for activation
of the time delays. The explosive valve for paraloon deployment was
bypassed for these two tests.
3.6.1 Preliminary System Tests
A. preliminary system test was conducted incorporating the major
prototype components of the recovery system. See figure 14. The test
simulated the following functions in the specified sequence.
a. Separation
b. Paraloon Cover Ejection and Deployment
c. Paraloon Separation
In conjunction with the above, several electromechanical com-
ponents were mounted to the structure in order to test their response
to the various functions. Similar components were initially screened
during the separation ring tests discussed earlier.
,
These electromechanical components included:
a. Aero-Mechanisms, Inc., Model 9010 Aneroid mounted to the
inside of an installed access hatch.
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b. Two Jay El time delays, Model 10166, were mounted to a
special plate fastened to the forward deck with small rubber
shock mounts.
c. Two relays, Babcock Model No. BR19lAX-D3-V3 mounted
to the same plate as item 2.
d. One Datametrics timer, Cook F/N 600100. S/N 002 was
hard mounted to the forward deck.
Each test involved the use of pyrotechnics and/or a pyrotechnic
device.
The paraloon was fastened at the neck closure and the 12 tiedowns.
A small slit in the hemisphere of the paraloon was necessary to release
entrapped air during packing. A "vent" bleed was later provided in the
production units for this purpose. After the paraloon was packed, the
cover was installed, and the prototype reservoir was pressurized to
3025 psig.
After all necessary electrical and visual checks, the test com-
menced. The timer was actuated prior to the separation test and
terminated after the test. On subsequent tests, the timer had pre-
and post-test checks. The No.2 and No.3 relays were given pre-
and post-test checks for each event.
The separation FLSC was initiated utilizing Hercules Dl19FO
detonators with backside initiation. The cut was virtually perfect.
The steel restraining strap functioned properly and prevent the
flaring out of the aluminum structure (see figure 15).
For paraloon inflation and cover deployment, power was applied
to the prototype exlosive valve, releasing the stored nitrogen. The
cover was deployed and the paraloon inflated.
It appeared that the paraloon was underpressurized, and inspection
revealed that leakage had occurred during inflation at the slip fitting on
the output of the explosive valve. This was found to be due to distor-
tions in the breadboard structure which were not fully removed after
the heavy ground impact damage experienced in the drop tests at
Bong AFB in September 1967. These distortions permitted a relatively
minor deflection of the parachute cover to vent nitrogen past the "0"
ring seals of the slip fitting. To minimize back-pressure during
inflation, the check valve in the fill neck was removed and replaced
with a coated fabric "flapper valve" over the diffuser ports inside the
paraloon. The slip joint engagement was also lengthened to minimize
chances of premature separation.
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For paraloon separation, the 7 grIft FLSC cut was a full 360 degrees
and the parachute cover was ejected from its position (see figure 16).
The cut edge remained recessed as initially designed to prevent
abrasion of the parachute riser lines. No cut edges were observed
above the recess, and no evidence of blow-by into the parachute com-
partment was found.
All electromechanical components survived the test and were still
operable. However, the aneroid and the timer had changed settings.
Refer to Section 3.5.1.3 for a discussion of these effects.
In concluslC;>U, the test was extremely successful. All electro-
mechanical components including the relays remained operable during
and after the test. A method to correct the aneroid was found, and
the shift in the timer was not critical since its function is to regulate
the time for separation only.
The steel band on the outside of the separation ring prevented
the aluminum structure from flaring out, thus minimizing the
possibility of damaging the paraloon during deployment.
The prototype pneumatic system for paraloon deployment and
cover ejection was tested. Design improvements resulting from the
test include removing the check valve, lengthening and revising the
mating assembly, installing a flap valve inside the paraloon on the
diffuser and a vent valve on the top of the paraloon for pump down.
The paraloon separation functioned perfectly and no redesign
was necessary in this area.
3.6.2 Prototype System Tests
Two prototype system tests were conducted utilizing the production
unit, Recovery System SIN 003. The purpose of the tests was to verify
that the detonator bndgewire problem has been resolved utilizing the
latest in detonator design. A secondary purpose was to check all of the
electrical and electromechamcal components of the recovery system
under the shock environment prod ced at separation and parachute
deployme t. The tests were conducted identically, using the final
configuration components and hardware. The paraloon deploy event
was not demonstrated since the shock spectrum involved in minimal
b comparison.
The unit waS modIfied slightly by eliminating the aneroid switches
from the circuit a d substituting a hand held switch for safety purposes.
In the normal circuitry, programmed mode, the paraloon deploy event
would occur simultaneously with separation, with the vehicle below
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altitude. Also, 15 seconds later, the parachute deploy event would
occur. Interrupting the programmed mode permitted visual inspection
of the unit between events and allowed the tests to be conducted with
the required safety.
Both tests conducted in the following fashion.
A. Both control systems fully exercised prior to the test as a
preset calibration.
B. Test commenced by pulling lanyards. utilizing internal
battery power to run timers, with the timers switching
power to the detonators for separation.
C. Visual inspection of unit.
D. Close simulated aneroid switch to activate the fifteen second
time delays. When the time delay expires, the parachute
deploy event occur s.
E. Visually inspect unit.
F. Exercise both control systems as a post-test calibration.
Both tests were conducted successfully with no discrepancies noted.
For each test, the modified Holex detonators were used. The separation
detonators utilized were Cook PIN 600190-001 (Holex PIN 7899) while
the parachute deploy detonator s used were Cook PIN 600190-103
(Holex PIN 7898). For each event, two detonators of each of the above
types were utilized, for a total of four per test.
3.7 High Temperature Tests
Several high temperature tests were conducted in an attempt to
verify the ability of the selected components to survive and operate in
the expected environment, and also to evaluate the response of the
structure to the thermal inpu.t expected during reentry. The following
sections describe the tests conducted and their results.
3.7.1 Detonator Selection Tests
Initial work began early in the program to select a detonator which
would function properly in the environment considered. A one dimen-
sional heat transfer study was made of the interface ring area. This
was accomplished by assuming the existence of a three inch thick
insulated aluminum plate, initially at a temperature of 200 0 F, but
subjected to a ramp input surface temperature rising to 4000 F in
25 seconds, and this held constant at 400°F for an additional period.
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This would simulate the 736 Ib, 180 degree trim, point mass re-entry
heating condition. The indications were that the detonator utilized for
oparachute deployment would have a temperature of 325 F at paraloon
separation for a worst case trajectory (Curve T 3 , figure 17). The
following describes the verification tests conducted.
3.7.1. 1 FLSC Initiation Tests
Two small test fixtures were made simulating the recovery system
structure. A flexible linear shaped charge of 7 grains/foot Configura-
tion I lead sheath RDX explosive. Ensign Bickford Company PIN B-7,
and a detonator. Hercules Powder Company piN Dl19B2, were installed
using backside initiation with zero gap. A thermocouple was placed
near the detonator and both units were placed in an electric oven. The
temperature was monitored continually during the test.
The temperature was raised from ambient to 200 0 F and soaked at
that temperature for ten minutes in order to simulate the trajectory to
be flown. The temperature was then rapidly raised to 355 0 F where
power was applied to each detonator.
Both units functioned normally. The detonator s ignited and in turn
initiated the FLSC. A O. 063 inch thick 2024-T4 aluminum plate was
shattered by the detonation.
It was concluded that the above mentioned detonators and RDX
FLSC were capable of withstanding the temperature environment
expected at the time of paraloon separation.
3.7.1. 2 Autoignition Tests
Three autoignition tests were conducted using the same detonators
as above for each test. A thermocouple was fastened to one of the
detonators by positioning the thermocouple on the cylindrical surface
of the detonator, wrapping aluminum foil around the pair. and crimping
the foil in place. Equal amounts of foil were used on each detonator
to assure a similar thermal mass.
The detonators were placed in an electric oven with the temperature
monitored at suitable time intervals b a Leeds and Northrop poten-
tiometer.
A temperature prohle was used which simulated the flight environ-
ment including reentry. The detonators were placed in the oven at
ambient temperature. The temperature was raised until a temperature
of 200 0 F was observed on the detonator. The detonator was soaked at
2000 F for ten minutes and then rapidly increased until autoignition
occurred.
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Pre-test visual inspection and resistance checks during heating
were made to assure a valid test
The following table gives the results of the autoignition test.
Test No. 1 Test No. 2 Test No.3
Detonator A B C D E F
Autoignition Temp. of 410 410 415 415 410 420
The minimum autoignation temperature was 4l00 F. Although only
one detonator was momtored for each test, it can be safely assumed
that the other was at close to the same temperature. Information
received from the manufacturer states that an autoignition tempera re
of above 400 0 F wo ld be expected.
Although the above tests were with a detonator other than that
utilized in the final design, the final desig:l detona or also contains
lead azide and RDX explosive in approximately the same amount. The
determining factor IS the a tolgnition temperature of the lead azide.
3.7.2 Structure Thermal Response Test
Since the inner FLSC does not fire until after reentry. it and its
detonators must withstand whatever heat is conducted to the groove
area from the 400 0 F outer sk1l1, without autoignition. In order to
determIne the peak temperature at the inner FLSC ring in the most
severe re-entry heating trajectory (case 32), it was decided to per-
form a test sImulating the 350 R/S structure response to the heat
pul s e input.
For this test. the recovery system rear face was exposed to a
specified temperature profile. A heat sO rce, consisting of a high
w ttage infr red lamp array. was targeted on the rear f ce of the
recovery system, and w s programmed to produce the following
time-temper"ture response In the R/S structure. The tempera re
at the in er FLSC groove was raised to 2000 F and main ained for
300 seconds. after which the outer temperature of the Interface ring
was increased to 4540 F in 30 seconds ,,-nd then abruptly terminated
by removing the lamps. Structure temperature was monitored by
thermocouples. Two thermocouples were located on the outside of
the interface rmg and two more a the ip-"ler FLSC groove.
The res~lts of thIS test are plotted 111 figu.re 18. As ca:l be seen,
the temperature of t e inner groove after the 30 second heat pulse
has risen from 20l o F to ohly 223 0 F hIle the outer surface of the
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interface ring has risen from 275 0 F to 4540 F. Therefore, it is apparent
that the temperature of the FLSC and detonators for parachute deployment
will be well within acceptable limits. This was later verified during the
High Temperature Qualification Test, see Section 4.1. 6 where the
temperature at the FLSC groove did not rise appreciably.
3.7.3 Paraloon Fabric Tests
The purpose of these tests was to check the response of the para loon
fabric (polyurethane coated HT-3 nomex, manufactured by Stern and
Stern of Hornell, New York), to a high temperature environmental such
as heating of the para loon cover during reentry.
Four fabric samples were used measuring 6 x 7 inches, with a
typical seam in the center parallel to the short side. An aluminum
plate was heated in an oven to 400 0 F. The plate temperature was
monitored by a thermocouple on the surface of the plate. When the
plate reached 4000 F the fabric sample was placed on it with a block
of wood and a 10 pound weight on top of it.
The block of wood simulated the insulating qualities of the packed
paraloon and the 10 pound weight simulated the packing density. The
time for each sample was varied.
The fir st fabric sample with the wood block and weight were placed
on the test plate for a period of thirty seconds. The only change noted
was an elongation when first removed from the oven. When allowed to
cool to room temperature, the fabric sample regained its original
shape with no permanent deformation.
For the second fabric samples, the procedure was similar except
one side of the fabric was folded on itself and the time period waS
again thirty (30) seconds on the 400 0 F plate.
Upon removal, the folded edge seemed tacky and stuck together
slightly. Also, the sample was more resilient but returned to
normal after cooling.
The procedure for the third fabric sample was similar except
both edges were folded and the time increment was one (1) minute.
After removal, both folds were tacky and stuck together slightly.
No unbonding of the polyurethane was observed as the sample was
unfolded. Again the sample was more resilient heated than at room
temperature. Some permanent set of the fabric did occur.
The final sample was folded on both edges and left in contact
with the plate for five (5) minutes.
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Upon removal, the fabric initially adhered to the aluminum plate
and the wood block. A shght trace of the polyurethane was left on the
wood block. The folder portion adhered to itself and was difficult to
pull apart. Approximately five (5) positions were observed where the
polyurethane coating had bee transferred, exposing the weave of the
base HT-3 nomex material. Permanent deformation was also evident
in that the folds were retained on the sample and rippling of the edges
wa s evident.
For each test, the plate temperature was observed to drop to
approximately 3800 1'.
In conclusion, it appears that the fabric can withstand a tempera-
ture of 4000 1' for a brief period of thirty seconds without a signihcant
change. The increase in elongation or resiliancy at eleva ed tempera-
ture is expected. However, exposure to a high temperature over
increasingly longer periods of time such as greater than five (5) minutes
could result in a complete unbonding of the polyurethane coa ing.
For a conservative design approach and inexpensive icsurance, 3.
liner of several plies of nomex material was incorporated ln the des:gn
between the paraloon cover and the packed paraloon.
4.0 UNIT QUALIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE TESTS
Two separate series of tests where performed on completed
recovery systems. The first series of tests were Qualification Tests,
and were performed on SIN I to verify the capability of the design 0
survice the expected environmental condItions and to successf.:.l1y
perform the intended functions.
A second series of tests were performed on all three units pr;or
to delivery in order to venfy that each was assembled properly and
was an accurate duplicate of the Qualihcation Test Uni. This ser:es
of tests was termed the Acceptance Tests.
Both series of tests were conducted in accordance with Co.,P:
Electric Company Specification 4890-206600-01, "Qualificat;on'inc.
Acceptance Test Plan," and Procedure 4890-206600-02, "Contr,,1
System Function Test Procedure."
The results of the tests were covered in detail in "Qualification
and Acceptance Test Report for Aerobee 350 Recovery System," and
the reader is directed to th t document for further information on
these tests.
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5.0 FIELD TESTING
After the initial three recovery systems were completed and
delivered, a field test program was initiated and executed in order to
realistically evaluate the performance of a recovery system under
actual flight conditions. This consisted of aircraft drop tests, and
was conducted at the Joint Parachute Test Facility, El Centro,
California during May 1969.
In conjunction with the test program, two identical Recovery
System Checkout Units and three vehicle payload configurations were
designed and delivered. The tests were performed with Recovery
System SIN 001, which was modified slightly for this purpose.
This section discusses the equipment and instrumentation
fabricated and prepared for the field test program. The contractor I s
responsibilities with respect to the aircraft drop tests proper were
limited to providing personnel support, and therefore these tests and
test results are not here covered in detail. For more detail informa-
tion on the tests and test results, the reader is directed to the Contract
Technical Monitor at Goddard Space Flight Center.
5.1 Recovery System Checkout Unit
The Aerobee 350 Recovery System Checkout Unit, see figure 19,
is a self-contained device complete with power and interconnecting
cables whose sole purpose is to dynamically test and monitor the
operation of the Aerobee 350 Recovery System. This unit, which is
similar to the Factory Simulator and Checkout Unit, is designed for
field usage with a complete recovery system that is fully assembled
and ready for flight.
Two Checkout Units were designed, fabricated, and delivered
during the program. They are identified as Cook pIN 206800,
SIN 001 and 002. A more complete description of the Checkout Unit
is given in Section 3.0 of the "Aerobee 350 Recovery System Field
Test Procedure."
5.2 Test Vehicles
Three different test vehicle configurations were designed and
delivered, one for each of the three planned drop tests. In each case,
the design waS compatible with the recovery system as well as the
necessary instrumentation and TIM gear.
The TIM rack with the required instrumentation and telemetry gear
was mounted to the forward face of the forward ring of the recovery
system. The telemetry system was designed to monitor and broadcast
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the shock and vibration loads imposed on the vehicle during the drop test
recovery sequence and to proces s the command signals broadcast to it.
5.2.1 First Drop Vehicle Configuration
The vehicle configuration for the first planned drop test was a cone-
cylinder having an overall length, including the recovery system, of
132 inches, or six vehicle diameters. The nose cone had an overall
length of three diameters. The unit was ballasted to 736 pounds and a
forward center of gravity located approximately 52 inches from the
paraloon cover.
5.2.2 Second Drop Vehicle Configuration
The vehicle configuration for the second planned drop test was
designed to simulate the proposed NASA/CSFC 17.04 Rocket Flight
Payload. It consisted of essentially a long, blunt-nosed cylinder
having a total length of 112.25 inches. The vehicle was ballasted to
a total weight of 640 pounds with the center of gravity located approx-
imately 40 inches from the paraloon cover.
5.2.3 Third Drop Vehicle Configuration
The final drop vehicle configuration was again a cone-cylinder
dimensionally identical to that planned for the first drop. The vehicle
was ballasted for a payload weight of 736 pounds and an aft center of
gravity located approximately 25.5 inches forward of the paraloon
cover.
In addition to the basic payload, an external jettisonable ballast
of 364 pounds was mounted to the aft end of the recovery system. The
purpose of the external ballast was to allow the vehicle to accelerate
more rapidly in order to reach the design paraloon deployment velocity
while falling from the aircraft. At the proper time the external ballast
would be released by a simulated "Separation" event. Two seconds
later the paraloon would be deployed. This drop was scheduled to be
a full systems test, with the recovery system performing the three
events of separation, paraloon deployment and parachute deployment.
5.3 Instrumentation
As a requirement for the test program, both the recovery system
and the payload were instrumented in order to provide a comparison
of actual flight data and that predicted. A variety of instrumentation
was provided and data was to be transmitted via a telemetry unit
within the payload. In addition to broadcasting the measured values,
the TIM system was capable of receiving and processing the "Command
Mode" signals to the recovery system.
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5.3.1 Recovery System Instrumentation
A vibration pickup transducer, Endevco Model 2221E, was mounted
to a fiberglass electronics mounting board on the forward deck. The
purpose of the pickup was to measure the response of the board during
the three pyrotechnic initiated recovery events. The unit has a range
of +50 g.
In addition to the vibration pickup, several pressure transducers
were installed. A Servonics Instruments, Inc. J pressure transducer,
Model 2091, with a range of 0-400 psig was mounted to the reservoir,
thus allowing the reservoir pressure to be monitored at all times
during flight via the telemetry link.
Four 0-15 psia pressure transducers, Servonics Model No. 3031,
were also installed. Three were installed at positions on the skin
adjacent to the present manifold pressure port points. The fourth was
mounted to sense the actual aneroid chamber pressure in an attempt
to correlate the time lag between the actual pressure sensed at the
three individual ports and that within the aneroid chamber itself.
Post test data analysis would provide an accurate pressure port
coefficient allowing the altitude sensing aneroid switche s to be set
more precisely in the future for the desired deployment altitude.
5.3.2 Payload Instrumentation
In addition to the telemetry gear of the payload, accelerprneters
were placed to monitor the "g" loads in all three axes. Magnetometers
were used to measure the vehicle roll rates in the yaw, pitch and roll
modes. Three pair of solar eyes were mounted to the payload skin 2.S
an aid in measuring vehicle attitude.
The information gathered by all of the sensors plus that produced
at other strategic monitor points was telemetered and recorded for
post test evaluation.
5.4 Drop Tests
Two drop tests were conducted. The initially scheduled first drop
vehicle configuration was used for the first drop. Due to range
scheduling problems, the second drop configuration was deleted and
the planned third drop vehicle configuration with the external ballast
was actually utilized for the second drop test.
5.4. 1 First Drop Test
The first drop test was conducted on 1 May 1969. The recovery
system operating sequence was altered slightly by deleting the
"Separation" event. The first event which was scheduled to occur
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after the vehicle was launched from the tailgate of the C-130 aircraft
was "Paraloon Deloy." This was to be followed by "Parachute Deploy"
15 seconds later.
The vehicle was dropped from the C-130 at a pressure altitude of
25,000 feet. This corresponded to an actual altitude of approximately
25,990 feet MSL. The vehicle fell for approximately 29 seconds to an
altitude of 19,300 feet MSL where "Paraloon Deployment" occurred at
a "q" of 91 psf and a velocity of 377 feet per second.
Approximately 15 seconds later, the parachute was deployed as
programmed. At that time, the "q" was 41 psf and the vehicle velocity
was 238 feet per second. Ground impact occurred at a total elapsed
time of 368 seconds, and at a rate of descent of 36 feet per second.
5.4.2 Second Drop Test
The second drop test was performed with the test vehicle config-
uration initially intended for the third drop test, including the external
jettisonable ballast. The test plan called for recovery to be initiated
by commanding the "Separation" event. To accomplish this, the
recovery system circuitry was altered slightly in the following fashion.
The connector to the aneroid switches was disconnected and the
circuit left open. Suitable wiring changes were made which utilized
the Sl and S2 time delays to deploy the paraloon two seconds after the
"Separation" event. The remainder of the circuitry was left intact,
with "Chute Deploy" scheduled to occur 15 seconds after "Paraloon
Deploy. "
The drop test occurred on 9 May 1969. Again, the vehicle was
dropped from the C-130 at a pressure altitude of 25,000 feet (MLS
altitude of 26,780 feet). The command "Separation" was scheduled
to be commanded from the ground at approximately 32 seconds from
the initial drop time. However, due to launching problems aboard
the aircraft, the scheduled drop time was missed and' actually
occurred some 12 seconds late. Since the precise zero time was
missed by the aircraft, and the vehicle was dropped late, ground
personnel did not have the proper zero time to initiate the "Command"
recover sequence. Recovery was initiated however by the programer
in the Automatic Mode.
The "Separation" event occurred at 34 seconds as programmed.
The 15 grift RDX FLSC was initiated, thus severing the ring and
releasing the external ballast. Two seconds later, the paraloon was
deployed as programmed, and at a "q" of 114 psi. However, approxi-
mately 9 seconds later, the parachute was deployed. This was some
6 seconds too early for the programmed mode. This apparent anomaly
was investigated and explained during a post drop evaluation, and a
minor circuit modification will preclude its reoccurrence in the future.
The remainder of the drop was normal and the vehicle was recovered.
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